A Diaspora Strategy for Canada? Enriching Debate through Heightening Awareness of International Practice

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Mark Boyle and Rob Kitchin

EXECUTIVE SUMMARY

Over the past decade a growing number of countries have become interested in revisiting, refreshing and rebuilding relations with their overseas populations. A new field of public policy, referred to as diaspora strategy, has emerged. A diaspora strategy is an explicit policy initiative or series of policy initiatives enacted by a sending state, or its peoples, aimed at fortifying and developing relationships with expatriate communities, diasporic populations, and foreign constituencies who share a special affinity. Notwithstanding their obvious differences, many countries are seeing merit in sharing experiences and through joint ‘policy transfer’ workshops, seminars, publications, toolkit manuals, and conferences are participating in an important global dialogue on international best practice with respect to the design and implementation of diaspora strategies.

Given that 2.8 million Canadian citizens live overseas (equivalent to 8% of the national population), including in such powerful economies as the United States and Greater China, not surprisingly within Canada too there now exists an embryonic interest in the possibility of formulating a Canadian diaspora strategy to enhance and build relations with this ‘secret province’. The Asian Pacific Foundation of Canada in Vancouver, an independent think-tank on Canada's relations with Asia, has launched a dedicated research program titled ‘Canadians Abroad’ which is seeking to understand the Canadian diaspora and to promote new thinking on how transnational connections might be better developed. Meanwhile, the Department of Foreign Affairs and International Trade (DFAIT) in Ottawa has established a high level ‘brainstorming’ working group to consider the possibility of rolling out a ‘Global Citizens’ initiative which is fundamentally interested in harnessing the Canadian diaspora to support Canadian foreign policy and trade interests internationally. Although both posture only as preliminary explorations at this point, it is clear that diaspora strategy is steadily starting to assert itself as a priority area within Canadian public discourse.

This report contends that any consideration of the virtues and vices of developing a diaspora strategy for Canada might be enhanced if the Canadian case is set into international context and if Canada draws from and contributes to the emerging global dialogue on diaspora strategies. The primary purpose of the report is to furnish interested parties in Canada with a summary overview of the more important and pioneering strategic interventions, institutional innovations and policy initiatives being undertaken globally. Our overview provides a comprehensive survey
of existing international practice in the field of diaspora strategy and includes (but is not limited to) the specific experiences of six countries who have been particularly active in leading debate across the past decade: Ireland, New Zealand, Scotland, Armenia, China, and India. We begin with a discussion of Canada’s recent turn towards its diaspora and argue that the work completed to date by the Asia Pacific Foundation’s Canadians Abroad Programme and laterally the DFAIT Global Citizens Project, has resulted in the specification of at least five critical questions or challenges for Canada:

a) Why might Canada benefit from a more strategic engagement with its overseas citizens?

b) Which institution(s) within Canada should be tasked with the responsibility of formulating and overseeing a diaspora strategy and should a new institution be created for this purpose?

c) Should and can the Canadian government play an enhanced role in building the Canadianess of the Canadian diaspora and work to harness

the Canadian diaspora as a resource in the formulation of Canadian foreign policy and diplomacy?

d) How can the Canadian diaspora be harnessed so as to improve the competitiveness of Canadian business and to stimulate Canadian economic development?

e) What challenges does the Canadian diaspora present to Canadian citizenship policy and how should Canadian approaches to citizenship respond?

We then take each of these five questions in turn and review the ways in which they are being raised and handled in other countries; in so doing we reflect upon what Canada might learn from and in turn contribute to international practice. The report is careful to avoid advocating specific policy prescriptions for Canada or to make premature assertions as to specific innovations which Canada might borrow, copy, and rework. But it does conclude by naming a selection of pioneering innovations and provocative exemplars which we hope, if studied and further debated, will serve to enrich the Canadian debate.
1. INTRODUCTION

Over the past decade a growing number of countries have become interested in revisiting, refreshing and rebuilding relations with their overseas populations. A new field of public policy, referred to as diaspora strategy, has emerged. Given that 2.8 million Canadian citizens live overseas (equivalent to 8% of the national population) not surprisingly within Canada too there now exists an embryonic interest in the possibility of formulating a Canadian diaspora strategy to enhance and build relations with this ‘secret province’. The Asian Pacific Foundation of Canada in Vancouver, an independent think-tank on Canada’s relations with Asia, has launched a special program titled ‘Canadians Abroad’ which is seeking to map and better understand the Canadian diaspora and to promote new thinking on how transnational connections might be better developed (Zhang 2007a, DeVoretz 2009a). Meanwhile, the Department of Foreign Affairs and International Trade (DFAIT) in Ottawa has established a high level ‘brainstorming’ working group to consider the possibility of rolling out a ‘Global Citizens’ initiative. This initiative is interested in exploring the possible harnessing of the Canadian diaspora to support Canadian foreign policy and trade interests internationally.

A cursory glance at existing international practice suggests that a wide range of different institutions, strategies, policies, programmes, and schemes are being developed and implemented across countries dependent upon the scale, history, geography, and nature of particular diaspora; the ‘foreign affairs’ institutional capacities which exist in sending countries; and homeland conditions, motivations and aspirations. Nevertheless notwithstanding their obvious differences, many countries are seeing merit in sharing experiences and through joint ‘policy transfer’ workshops, seminars, publications, toolkit manuals, and conferences are participating in an important global dialogue on international best practice with respect to the design and implementation of diaspora strategies.

Any consideration of the virtues and vices of developing a diaspora strategy for Canada might be enhanced if the Canadian case is set into international context and if Canada draws from and contributes to the emerging global dialogue. The primary purpose of this report is to furnish interested parties in Canada with a summary overview of the more important and pioneering strategic interventions, institutional innovations and policy initiatives being undertaken globally. Our overview provides a comprehensive survey of existing international practice in the field of diaspora strategy and includes six countries whom have been particularly active in this area across the past decade: Ireland, New Zealand, Scotland, Armenia, China, and India. Whilst some country case studies bear more relevance to Canada than others, our purpose is not to prejudge from where lessons might be learned. In our experience countries can and do glean insights from each other and can and do effect policy transfers in spite of their dissimilarity. Equally the report is careful to avoid advocating specific policy prescriptions for Canada or to make premature assertions as to specific innovations which Canada might borrow, copy, and rework. But it does include some reflection on the implications of international practice for Canada and does identify a list of innovative programmes which might prove to be of particular interest should Canada decide to move forward in this field.
Our review is organized to reflect our own prior research and distinctive approach to global comparative analyses (Ancien, Boyle and Kitchin 2009a, 2009b, 2009c, Boyle, Kitchin and Ancien 2009; Kitchin and Boyle 2010). However, it also aligns itself with and, in many ways complements, other important commentaries on diaspora strategizing (Newland and Patrick 2004, Kutzensov 2006, Levitt and Jaworsky 2007, Gamlen 2008, Aikins, Sands and White 2009). In particular, we note the valuable series of research reports on diaspora engagement produced by the Migration Policy Institute in association with USAid in 2010. These papers examine respectively diaspora entrepreneurship, diaspora investment in capital markets, diaspora tourism, diaspora philanthropy, diaspora volunteering, and diaspora advocacy (gathered in Newland 2010). We begin with a discussion of Canada’s recent turn towards its diaspora and argue that the work completed to date by the Asia Pacific Foundation’s Canadians Abroad Project and laterally the DFAIT Global Citizens Project has raised at least five critical questions or challenges for Canada. We then take each of these five questions in turn and review the ways in which they are being raised and handled in other countries. In so doing, we reflect upon what Canada might learn from and in turn contribute to international practice. We conclude by identifying a specific selection of pioneering innovations and provocative exemplars which we hope will prove to be useful reference material which will enrich the Canadian debate.

To begin, a brief note on definitional matters is in order. To date those who promulgate a need for diaspora strategies have sought to make decisions on three critical definitional matters. First, whether the term diaspora is an appropriate label for the populations they seek to engage per se. and whether they might be prepared to deploy the category even if only to bring their initiatives into international debates. A by now legion of social scientific excavation of the genealogy and mobilization of the category confirms that its current celebrity status in academic, policy, and public circles has come at the price of definitional clarity (Safran 1991, Cohen 1997, and Tsagarousianou 2004). Secondly, the extent to which diaspora strategies should target only native born diasporic populations or national citizens or whether it might be broadened to incorporate all populations with an affinity for a particular homeland irrespective of their nationality. A range of non nationals - the so called affinity diaspora - and for a variety of reasons often feel inclined to contribute to particular countries; courting these wider audiences has positive and negative ramifications. Finally, the degree to which diasporic populations should be bracketed by generation; whether attention be afforded strictly to first generation migrants, at most second generation, at most third generation, and so on. Indeed in the case of some nations, national groupings have never held citizenship of the state to which they feel a primary sense of belonging - the state may have been created long after the nation was born; these groups cannot be ignored but what status are they to be accorded? We will refrain from fastening on any particular definition of diaspora and will insist instead that definitional matters form part of diaspora strategies and are not innocent or neutral antecedents to such strategies. Clearly decisions on definitions lead to the inclusion and exclusion of different population groupings and as a consequence carry important implications for the types of diaspora strategies which might be imagined (Ho 2011).
2. THE ASIA PACIFIC FOUNDATION: LEADING CANADA’S TURN TOWARDS A MORE SYSTEMATIC DIASPORA STRATEGY

Hitherto, public discourse on the Canadian expatriate community, to the extent it has arisen, has focused upon the impacts of Canadian migration to the United States (often speculatively referred to as a ‘brain drain’) on the Canadian economy. Prompted in part by the evacuation of nearly 15,000 Canadian passport holders from Lebanon in 2006, the then imminent review of Canadian policy towards dual citizenship, and Canadian diplomatic unrest over the conviction of a Canadian citizen in China on charges of terrorism, in 2008 the Asian Pacific Foundation of Canada launched a systematic research program titled ‘Canadians Abroad’. The objective of this program was to map and profile Canadians living abroad, to produce a balanced and comprehensive overview of the strengths, weaknesses, opportunities and threats presented by the Canadian expatriate community and; to consider whether Canada needed to think more strategically about its diaspora rather than dealing with problems as they arose on a case by case bases. The work of the Asia Pacific Foundation has served to produce important estimates of the scale and geography of the emigrant population, insights into the socio-economic and attitudinal profiles of emigrants, and understandings of the connections which already exist between diasporic communities and Canada. Now nearing completion, the Canadians Abroad programme is turning its attention to the consequences of the Canadian diaspora for Canada and how Canada might respond so as to best engage its overseas populations.

Because emigration and immigration are substantially linked in Canada, it is first necessary to set the work of the Asian Pacific Foundation against the backdrop of Canada’s long history of immigration (Boyd and Vickers 2000, Bourne and Rose 2001, and Ley 1999 provide useful overviews). Record numbers of immigrants settled in Canada in the early 1900s. By 1931 2.3 million or 22% of Canadians were foreign born, deriving principally from Europe and in particular from the United Kingdom. Because immigration levels declined during the 1930s Great Depression and in the ensuing years of the second world war, the proportion of foreign-born dropped to 17.5% (2 million) in 1941 and 14.7% (2 million) in 1951, but subsequently recovered and has since grown again, to 15.6% (2.8 million) in 1961, 15.3% (3.3 million) in 1971, 16% (3.8 million) in 1981, 16.1% (4.3 million) in 1991 and 18.4% (5.5 million) in 2001. In 2006, 19.8% of Canada’s population (or 6.2 million) was foreign born (Chui, Maheux, Kelly 2007). Whilst in 1971 migrants from Europe constituted 61.6% of all newcomers, by 2006 they comprised only 16.1% of all newcomers. Meanwhile whilst in 1971 migrants born in Asia (including the Middle East) made up only 12.1% of recent newcomers, by 2006 such migrants constituted the largest proportion of newcomers to Canada at 58.3% (Chui, Maheux, Kelly 2007). In 2006 863,100 individuals, or 2.8%, of the national population reported holding both Canadian citizenship and at least one other citizenship. The majority (85.1%) of foreign-born migrants who were eligible for Canadian citizenship in 2006 had become naturalized.

Long regarded as a home to immigrants from around the world, Canada is less well known for its own large diaspora. Indeed in 2007 Zhang referred to his seminal search for the Canadian diaspora as ‘mission
invisible’. Given that Canada does not collect official statistics about its overseas population, Zhang’s project represented a pioneering first attempt to quantify the scale and geography of Canadian flight overseas. Zhang estimated the Canadian diaspora to be circa 2.7 million in number, representing approximately 8.3 per cent of the national population (Zhang 2006, 2007a). This meant that on a per capita basis Canadians were twice as likely as Australian citizens, three times more likely than United States citizens and four times more likely than citizens of India, to move beyond their country of origin. According to Zhang’s early work, circa 1.2 million Canadians dwelled in the United States, 270,000 were resident in Hong Kong and 378,000 in the rest of Asia, 486,000 now lived in Europe, and 378,000 were distributed across countries in South America and Africa and the Caribbean. Forty per cent of Canadians in Asia or the U.S. (or 720,000 people) were from Ontario; 30 per cent (circa 550,000) were from British Columbia, and; 12 per cent (216,000) were from Quebec (Zhang 2006). Moreover Zhang’s data suggests that whilst 65% of out migrants were Canadian by birth 35% were foreign born, of which 29% gained Canadian citizenship through immigration and naturalization (Zhang 2007a).

DeVoretz (2009a) has since consolidated and built upon Zhang’s work to yield further estimates of the scale and profiles of the character of the Canadian expatriate community. DeVoretz’s methodology was based upon drawing inferences from a) population changes between census which cannot be accounted for on the bases of fertility and mortality, b) longitudinal administrative data sets tracking population changes within specific population groupings, and c) census and administrative date sets held in known and suspected countries of destination. Confirming the accuracy of Zhang’s estimate, DeVoretz concluded that approximately 2.8 million Canadian Citizens currently live abroad. In addition, DeVoretz’s (2009a) work demonstrated that 57% of Canadians living abroad were located in descending order in the United States (1.1 million), Greater China (292,000), the United Kingdom (70,000) and Australia (27,289). With specific respect to the outmigration of foreign born Canadian citizens DeVoretz suggests that Canada’s immigrant population has a higher net exit rate (4.5% of the population) than its Canadian born population (1.3%), that migrants from Taiwan (30%), Hong Kong (24%), Japan (13%), Singapore (12%), and the United States (11%) have the highest net exit rates, and that even second generation South Asian and Chinese-Canadian citizens have exit rates of 9.9% and 11.0% respectively.

In seeking to better understand the attitudes and views of Canadians abroad, in 2007 the Asia Pacific Foundation undertook a survey with 549 expatriates in Asia and the United States. This survey explored expatriates socio-economic profile, reasons for migrating, expected duration of relocation, citizenship status and attachments to Canada, ties to Canada, and views on such matters as dual citizenship, voting rights, taxes, and government services. Perhaps the most interesting findings were that 95% of respondents had post secondary education, over 56% had lived outside of Canada for over five years, 64% continued to call Canada home, 65% had left Canada for career opportunities, 73% supported the idea of establishing a Federal agency for overseas Canadians, and 69% planned to return to Canada and establish permanent residency there (Zhang 2007b).

In 2010 the Asian Pacific Foundation undertook a national poll (sample size 2093)
within Canada itself in an effort to better comprehend Canadian views towards Canadian’s living overseas. A significant majority of the sample (73%) agreed that Canada would benefit from a central agency to oversee relations with Canadians abroad; 66% agreed that children of Canadians born overseas should have the same citizenship rights as children of Canadians born in Canada; 63% of Canadians agreed that Canada should continue to promote a dual citizenship policy, but only 51% of participants were in support of the idea that Canadian citizens living abroad should have the same voting rights as Canadian citizens living in Canada (Zhang 2010a).

In addition the Asia Pacific Foundation has compiled a series of ‘portrait reports’ on Canadian expatriate communities in the United States (estimated 1.1 million), India (estimated 1,530), Singapore (estimated 5000), South Korea (estimated 15,000), United Kingdom (estimated 72,000), Hong Kong (estimated 250,000), Beijing (estimated 20,000), China’s Xiamen and Guangzhou province (estimated 577,000), Shanghai (estimated 6,121), Vietnam (estimated 1,500), and Trinidad and Tobago (estimated 5,000). More specifically DeVoretz and Battisi (2009) have provided a comparative analyses of the socio-economic status of Canadian emigrants in the United States and Hong Kong, whilst Zhang (2010a) has profiled migration to and from Canada and China, and has considered further flows of tourists, students, and non resident workers between both countries.

Canada of course already enjoys a substantial and dense set of relations with its overseas communities. Arguably in the Canadian case, to date the mapping of these relations has tended to be focussed upon Canadian expatriate groups in the United States. This would include but would not be limited to:

- C100 - a non-profit, member-driven organization dedicated to supporting Canadian technology entrepreneurship and investment through partnerships among Canadians in Silicon Valley.
- Canadians Abroad - a non-profit, volunteer, social and cultural organization and social networking vehicle for Canadians living in the Greater Los Angeles area.
- All-Canada University Alumni Association - an alumni network for all graduates from any Canadian University which through pooling resources is able to organise alumni events across the world.
- The Canadian Expat Association - a non-profit, non-government lobby, social and cultural, and business organisation, linking all Canadians living abroad under one bilingual platform
- Connect2Canada - a government run social networking site designed to promote ongoing interaction and networking between Canadians living abroad under one bilingual platform
- The Canadian Expat Network (CEN) - a privately run online community that connects Canadian expatriates and informs overseas citizens of the latest news from Canada.
- The Canadian American Business Alliance of South Florida – which promotes business networking among Canadians living in South Florida and between South Florida and Canada.
- The Canadian American Chamber of Commerce - a network bringing together those who share similar
interests with the purpose of exploring new business opportunities.

- The Canadian Snowbird Association - a national not-for-profit 70,000-member advocacy organization dedicated to actively defending and improving the rights and privileges of traveling Canadians.

In conducting their work the Asia Pacific Foundation of Canada has begun the task of mapping diasporic groups both within the United States and elsewhere in greater detail. From this work it is clear that a whole range of less well known Canadian business, social, cultural, and political organizations exists in Asia in particular. Examples include the Canadian China Business Council, Canadians in China, Canadian Club in Hong Kong, Chinese Canadian Association in Hong Kong, Indonesia Canada Chamber of Commerce, Association of Canadian Teachers in Japan, Tokyo Canadians hockey club, Canadian Association of Malaysia, Canadian Club of Phillipines, Canadian Association of Singapore, Canadian Society in Taiwan, and the Canadian Chamber of Commerce in Vietnam. Whilst an important start, more work remains to be done if the full range of existing organisations are to be identified and their functions understood.

On the bases of their work the Asia Pacific Foundation of Canada has called for a public debate on the implications of the Canadian diaspora for Canada and on the merits of designing a formal Canadian diaspora strategy. DeVoretz states this case particularly cogently when he asserts:

‘The current approach to policy formulation on Canadians abroad alternates between crisis management and benign neglect, with little or no coordination among the many departments that have a role to play. Canadians abroad are often seen as a ‘brain drain’ for the country, but it is also possible to conceive of expatriates as overseas assets for Canada, much in way that we have come to appreciate the value of Canadian companies with a global presence. The challenge is to develop a suite of policies that embrace Canadians abroad and which encourage their attachment to Canada. At the same time, prudent public policy requires a careful assessment of the fiscal, security and diplomatic risks posed by a large overseas population. A concerted effort to understand the opportunities and challenges presented by Canadians abroad, and a coordinated approach to policy formulation, could turn this underutilized asset into a formidable advantage for Canada.’ (DeVoretz 2009a)

In moving towards the formulation and design of a diaspora strategy for Canada, five questions would appear to be presenting themselves as of especial importance.

\textit{a) Why might Canada benefit from a more strategic engagement with its overseas citizens?}

As the scale, geography, and character of the Canadian diaspora have become better understood, attention has increasingly been given to whether the Canadian Government should develop a formal diaspora strategy. Should the Canadian state intervene and what would the objectives of such intervention be? The central proposition which has emerged from the Canadians Abroad project is that because the overseas Canadian community holds important strengths, weaknesses, threats and opportunities for Canada such a strategy is now overdue (Zhang 2007a, 2009a). A beginning has been made in the convening by the Department of Foreign Affairs and
International Trade (DFAIT) of a working group on Global Citizens and the organizing in March 2010 of a one-day workshop with experts, practitioners and stakeholders from DFAIT, other government departments, civil society and academia on how global citizens might support Canadian foreign policy and trade interests internationally. Attention has been given to the merits of developing new policies with respect to improving embassy, consular and emergency services, engaging other diasporas resident in Canada, promoting advocacy for Canada on the international stage among youth groups, students, teachers and alumni, and promoting Canadian competitiveness in the global economy. It remains to be seen if the Global Citizens project will emerge as a policy priority for DFAIT and will come to any concrete fruition but certainly the seeds of a new journey would appear to have been sown.

b) Which institution(s) within Canada should be tasked with the responsibility of formulating and overseeing a diaspora strategy and should a new institution be created for this purpose?

To date, some consideration has been given to the importance of fortifying embassy and consular services. In Embassy Magazine in March 2010 DeVoretz and Parasaram go further and consider the case for instituting a new Ministry of Canadians Abroad (DeVoretz and Parasaram 2010). They point to the challenges Canada faced in responding to the need for hasty evacuation from war zones in Lebanon and Sri Lanka, providing aid for earthquake survivors in Pakistan and Haiti, addressing the panic which surrounded the finding of the SARS virus among Canadians returning from Hong-Kong, and dealing with a Canadian citizen reporter murdered in Iran and a Canadian dissident jailed in China. These challenges produced a series of discrete and short-term policies based upon the principal of crises management. A more strategic and long-term approach might have helped define the limits and possibilities of Canadian Government support for its overseas citizens. DeVoretz and Parasaram support the concept of introducing a coherent and transparent triage approach. To oversee this approach they argue that a formal Ministry of Canadians Abroad might prove a useful innovation and contend that at a minimum, there needs to be a centralization of responsibility for Canada’s overseas population within a lead ministry.

c) Should and can the Canadian government play an enhanced role in building the Canadianess of the Canadian diaspora and work to harness the Canadian diaspora as a resource in the formulation of Canadian foreign policy and diplomacy?

Because it has emerged as a relatively new nation, because it has grown as a nation of immigrants, and because it lacks a popular history of trauma and victimhood, arguably Canada has a relatively weak national identity; marked perhaps by its comparatively low key celebration of Canada Day. Canadian national identity is also complicated, defined in part by the country’s indigenous roots, its British and European legacy, its support for multicultural and tolerant values, and its otherness from the United States (Harder 2010). The Canadian diaspora in no sense is an exemplar of a classic victim diaspora and fostering a sense of ethnic nationalism or ethnic Canadianness in the diaspora is not appropriate or particularly relevant. But this does not mean that building the Canadian diaspora is not possible or important, that Canada’s overseas communities cannot bear witness to and promote Canadian values and aspirations around the world, and that the
Canadian diaspora cannot work to effect international diplomacy and enhance Canadian foreign policy and international relations. Waters (2008) has demonstrated that in spite of keeping ties with their country of origin, many migrants in Canada in fact display a high level of local loyalty and engage substantially in civic participation. Zhang (2009b, 2010c) likewise has shown that Canadian’s living abroad retain a strong sense of their Canadianness and participate transnationally in Canadian affairs. In addition Yu (2010) has mapped the existence of over 60 Canadian diasporic media outlets, 53 media organizations and 110 alumni publication outlets in 12 selected destinations in Asia, Europe, North America and the Middle East. Abd-El-Aziz et al. (2005) and Carment and Bercuson (2008) provide a valuable scoping study of what other countries’ diasporas who reside in Canada might contribute to the fortification of Canada’s role in international affairs. Canadianness exists as a complex but meaningful cultural identity among diasporic communities and decisions might usefully be made about how the Canadian government might support and nurture patriotic good will towards Canada.

**d) How can the Canadian diaspora be harnessed so as to improve the competitiveness of Canadian business and to stimulate Canadian economic development?**

When set in international context, there is no doubt that the Canadian diaspora is a comparatively well-resourced and well-endowed diaspora and one which is especially ripe to be engaged to promote the global competitiveness of the Canadian economy: not least in terms of its scale, demography, geography, and skill composition. DeVoretz (2009b) has demonstrated that the Canadian diaspora is comparatively large in proportion to national population when compared with other global competitors; is comparatively young and skilled; has its most significant presence in the two leading economies of the present century (the United States and China), and is sourced principally from Ontario, British Columbia, and Quebec Provinces, which include the financial, business, cultural, and political muscle and might of Toronto, Vancouver, Montreal, and Ottawa. The conditions seem right, both in the diaspora and within Canada, for a Canadian diaspora strategy to be particularly effective in brokering Canadian participation in the global economy. Not surprisingly, an explicit and core pillar of the Global Citizens project is to cultivate the Canadian diaspora to further Canada’s Foreign Direct Investment (FDI) objectives. Zhang (2010b) points to the potential business, tourism, and educational benefits which flow from China to Canada and which are lubricated by Chinese Canadians. Lin, Guan, and Nicholson (2008) identify a subset of the Chinese community in Canada, International Educated Professionals (IED), who have developed a niche as transnational entrepreneurs and who accomplish important work in improving technological innovation in Canadian companies. Zweig (2008) meanwhile has argued that Canada could do more to engage and harness the long term business opportunities presented by Chinese students studying in Canadian universities.

**e) What challenges does the Canadian diaspora present to Canadian citizenship policy and how should Canadian approaches to citizenship respond?**

Canada’s recent interest in rethinking its rules on citizenship stem from the fact that it is a country with a strong history of immigration, where a very particular subset
of and minority of the immigrant population arrives, becomes naturalised and re-emigrates (DeVoretz 2009a, Nyers 2010). Among some constituencies, there would appear to be concern that Canadian citizenship is being appropriated by migrants for strategic reasons and that Canada is being treated as something of a migrant hotel. But a much wider set of questions demand attention. According to Zhang (2010c) Canada’s approach to citizenship might be serving to discourage its overseas population from engaging with Canada rather than encouraging the formation of new relationships. Zhang’s focus is upon a) the withdrawal of the right of Canadians to vote in Canada after they have lived overseas for five years (affecting an estimated 1.4 million people); b) the role of Canada’s tax system in discouraging internationally mobile Canadians to retain ties with Canada, and; c) amendments to citizenship law (B-37) which were introduced in Canada in 2009 following the ‘lost Canadians debate’ which restrict intergenerational transfer of Canadian citizenship by descent to citizens who live overseas. Parasram (2010) meanwhile has ‘plumbed’ Canadian citizenship policy to reveal eight challenges (residency requirements, under appreciation of non-government work abroad, statelessness, gender and motherhood, attachment, plural citizenship, equity, and security) which are elevated and complicated by overseas Canadian populations. Meanwhile Macklin and Crépeau (2010) also show that Canada already offers a reduced franchise to Canadians abroad when compared with other countries and that in any event access to public health care, social services, and education is mediated principally by provincial residence and not citizenship status. The critical question remains an open question therefore: what kinds of citizenship rights and responsibilities does and should Canada bestow on its expatriate communities and why?

As Canada deliberates over whether or not to develop a formal and systematic diaspora strategy finding answers to these five questions will assume ever greater importance. But importantly these questions are ones that have vexed other governments who have already trodden this same path. Whilst undoubtedly each country will be required to find their own way it is prudent that the Canadian government reviews the decisions and choices which have been made elsewhere and ruminates over the lessons, if any, which might be gleaned. In the remainder of this report we present a summary overview of the experience of other countries who have chosen to pioneer diaspora strategies and consider the potential implications of international practice for Canada.
3. THE RATIONALE FOR DEVELOPING A DIASPORA STRATEGY

Why at this historical moment are a growing number of sending countries seeking to develop explicit and systematic strategies aimed at creating, managing and energizing relationships with their diasporic populations? Three overarching reasons present themselves. Firstly, whilst historically diasporic groups have played a significant role in nation and state building projects in the homeland and historically nations and states have looked to diasporic groups to promote their interests overseas, the twenty first century is witnessing a new wave of nation and state building, and as a corollary a fresh and novel impetus for new migrant contributions to and on behalf of political, social and cultural causes in the homeland. Indeed within some countries there is now emerging a rethinking of the nation state as at once, a) a territorially bounded community and; b) a globally networked community. Secondly, whilst emigration was once viewed as an indictment of the failure of development policy (the so-called brain drain), overseas migrant communities are now being re-appropriated as a potential catalyst for economic expansion and the securing of global competitive advantage. Levering and harnessing the resources, contacts, knowledge, and talents of migrants from overseas locations, rather than simply seeking to encourage return migration, is now being viewed as a desirable policy approach. Finally growing international migration is challenging the models of citizenship adopted in many sending states, leading to a revisiting and clarification of emigrants’ entitlements and obligations and in some cases to the introduction of entirely fresh categories of citizenship. Albeit tempered by fears of geopolitical instability and security concerns, yet ever more states are permitting forms of dual and even multiple citizenship.

The population of Ireland is circa 4.4 million. There are 800,000 Irish born people living overseas and 3.1 million Irish Citizens (passport holders) dwelling overseas (the majority in both cases in the United Kingdom). More broadly, there are an estimated 70 to 80 million people who claim Irish ancestry, mainly in the United Kingdom, USA, Canada, Australia, New Zealand, and Argentina. The history of Anglo-Irish relations, the Great Irish Famine in the 1940s and the representation of the Irish diaspora as a victim diaspora have conspired to create an elevated patriotism among Irish communities abroad. The Irish diaspora has changed the course of Irish history through remittance payments and political mobilization in support of nationalist movements. In 2002, in the midst of the buoyant Celtic Tiger economic boom, Ireland commissioned a Task Force on Policies Towards Emigration which recommended using the country’s new found wealth to extend welfare assistance to overseas populations, especially vulnerable groups (the elderly, infirm, sick, the poor and prisoners) who left Ireland in the 1950s and the 1980s to move to British cities. Recently, Ireland’s policy towards its diaspora has been equally motivated by two further considerations. Firstly, there is growing concern that the strength of diasporic attachment and affiliation to Ireland might be waning (ironically not least because of peace in Northern Ireland) and that a certain level of disenchantment exists. The Irishness of the Irish diaspora can no longer be taken for granted. As a consequence, priority is now being given to the nurturing of the social and cultural life of the diaspora and its continued enthusiasm for matters Irish (Ancien, Boyle and Kitchin...
Secondly, given the dramatic collapse of the Irish economy, banking system, and property sector from 2007, there is growing recognition that diasporic networks have a role to play in brokering the country’s economic revival. The Irish diaspora is one tool to be harnessed to rescue a country which is quite literally bankrupt.

The population of New Zealand is 4.3 million. Circa 750,000 New Zealanders live outside New Zealand. Although present in 178 countries, the New Zealand diaspora dwells principally in Australia, with the UK, Canada, and the USA being of lesser importance. New Zealand’s diaspora strategy arose in recognition of the geographical isolation and peripherality of New Zealand and the importance of harnessing expatriates to connect to the global economy. The strategy seeks to promote the idea that New Zealand is at once a nation state in the remote Southern hemisphere and a globally networked community and as such New Zealand is pioneering the concept that the nation state can be territorially bounded on the one handed but deterritorialised and globally connected on the other. The New Zealand diaspora strategy seeks to connect New Zealand and its diaspora to improve global economic competitiveness, lever investment, circulate and embed technology and knowledge, promote the New Zealand brand, and foster return migration.

The population of Scotland is 5.15 million. Overseas Scots total circa 1.27 million, two thirds of whom dwell in England. A wider ancestral diaspora is estimated to be circa 28-40 million and based mainly in the USA, Canada, Australia and New Zealand. Although Scotland now has its own Government, it remains a constituent part of the United Kingdom and only enjoys a limited number of devolved powers. Scotland’s turn to its diaspora stems from debates in the early 2000s about impending skill shortages. At the time it was believed that the Scottish population was in decline and that Scotland’s population could dip below five million and fortifying positive net migration (including courting returning diasporians) was the preferred policy option. From this point of departure, three additional progenitors of the Scottish diaspora strategy have emerged. Firstly, there remains a belief that population growth will be an important stimulus to the economic development of Scotland and Scotland has set itself the target of matching the average European EU (EU15) population growth over the period from 2007 to 2017. Secondly, in so far as diasporic populations can help Scottish businesses compete in the world market and help broker transnational capital investment into Scotland, it is believed that the diaspora can help the Scottish economy to become ‘smarter’ and ‘wealthier’. Finally, with the Scottish National Party now presiding over the devolved Scottish Government, the Scottish diaspora is seen as integral to the building of a new species of Scottish civic nationalism.

Whilst emigration from Armenia has been a constant feature of its history, the main waves of large-scale, systematic and forced emigration were 1894-1896, 1915-22, and 1988 to the present. The consequence is a sizeable and classical victim diaspora of some six million plus located in five predominant geographic locations – former Soviet states (e.g., Russia 2,250,000; Georgia 460,000; Ukraine, 150,000); North America predominately concentrated in the United States (1,400,000); Europe, with by far the largest concentration in France (450,000); the Middle East (with large groupings in Lebanon, 234,000 and Syria, 150,000); and South America with a large
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group in Argentina (130,000). Undoubtedly Armenia struggled with its transition from a socialist satellite state to an independent republic after independence in 1992 and at least according to some viewpoints within Armenia relations with the diaspora were more a hinderance than a help. The first post independence Armenian President Ter-Petrossian provoked the ire of the diaspora by adopting a strategic and pragmatic relationship with historical foes Turkey and Azerbaijan. Petrossian recognised the resources of the diaspora to be a vast asset but considered its brand of ideological foreign policy to be a liability. The election of President Kocharyan in 1998 announced a new departure. Kocharyan adopted a foreign policy which was more nationalistic and in tune with the aspirations of the diaspora. In return he sought and secured support from the diaspora. Walking the typerope between securing domestic autonomy and sourcing overseas assistance proved to be a challenge but one which generated benefits. More recently President Sargsyan, who was elected in 2008, has continued to court the diaspora aggressively and in his program for government published in 2007 gave a commitment to prioritize the development and implementation of a ‘conceptual framework’ for Armenia diaspora relations, a comprehensive ‘consolidation of diaspora policies’ and the establishment of a ‘dedicated diaspora agency’.

The population of China is circa 1.4 billion. The population of overseas Chinese is circa 42 million, 80% of whom live in South East Asia, with North America, Europe and Australia being of progressively lesser importance. Since the People’s Communist Party came to power in 1949 China (People’s Republic of China or PRC) has sought to reach out to overseas Chinese citizens, even when at times they viewed these citizens with a certain suspicion – especially during the isolationist periods when Mao Tse Tung held power. Article 98 of the PRC’s 1954 Constitution guarantees the legal protection and rights of overseas citizens and allows for their formal participation in the National People’s Congress. Under the comparatively more moderate Den Xiaoping, the PRC’s perspective on the Chinese diaspora was nevertheless dramatically transformed. From the 1980s onwards, and certainly following the Tiananmen Square incident in 1989, the PRC has actively courted the Chinese diaspora with a view to brokering a progressive relationship between China and the world, and in particular to promote international diplomacy, knowledge transfer, trade and investment.

The population of India is 1.2 billion. The population of the Indian diaspora is circa 25 million, broadly spread and present in 110 countries. The diaspora formed in four waves of migration: indentured labour migration, post independence (1947) migrations, the Middle Eastern oil boom migration, and the more recent movement of knowledge workers to Silicon Valley in California. India’s turn to its diaspora was stimulated by a government commissioned report undertaken by an influential High Level Committee on the Indian Diaspora in 2001. With the country standing at the threshold of emerging as a global economic power, the strategy was motivated by a concern to harness the economic potential of the global Indian diaspora. But the strategy was also stimulated by a desire to further develop and broadcast India’s confident postcolonial identity to the world, using the diaspora to parade its technological prowess, brand of tolerant ecumenical Hinduism, and progressive attitudes to multiculturalism (diasporeans are encouraged to be loyal to their new homes first and foremost).
Interest in engaging diasporic populations then normally originates in trigger events which arise in one of three policy fields; nation and state building, improving global economic competitiveness, and developing new approaches to defining and servicing national citizenship. For Ireland, diaspora strategy was initially conceived as an opportunity to spend the fiscal surpluses of the Celtic Tiger boom on the protection and welfare of vulnerable and forgotten overseas migrants; for Israel, motivation derives principally from the desire to protect and defend the right of the state of Israel to exist; for Scotland, concern initially was with low fertility levels and the social, economic, political, and cultural consequences of a shrinking population; for New Zealand, the diaspora is seen as a means of countering geographical isolation from the global economy; for Armenia, the diaspora is being seen as a resource in the reassertion and reclamation of a post-Soviet national identity and trajectory; for India and China, diasporic groups are being deployed to broker integration into the global economy at a moment when the global distribution of power is being realigned; whilst for Mexico, the efficient harnessing of diasporic remittances is being promoted to counter the effects of population flight from the global south. It is common for diaspora strategies to broaden out from their point of origin and to populate all three policy fields. Quite how the point of departure (the specific policy field and particular triggers) of any diaspora strategy enables and constrains the subsequent rolling out of this strategy remains to be understood.

a) Why might Canada benefit from a more strategic engagement with its overseas citizens?

It is clear that Canada has stakes in its diaspora with respect to the three progenitors of diaspora strategy identified above; in promoting national economic development, in redefining citizenship law and entitlements, and in promoting Canadian social, cultural, and political values and interests globally. But Canada has a unique point of entry to the global diaspora strategy debate too. From our vista, Canada’s role as a global immigrant magnet and leading proponent of multiculturalism, and the important subset of Canadian’s abroad who are naturalised Canadians, provides the country with a fundamentally unique resource which, if harnessed properly, could define its diaspora strategy and brand it as globally innovative. In the introduction to this report we insisted that far from being a neutral bystander, definitions of diaspora condition the kinds of diaspora strategies that are capable of being imagined and enacted. In the DFAIT concept of the global citizen Canada has an opportunity to contribute original thinking to the global dialogue on diaspora strategy. The concept of the global citizen, incorporating as it does all constituencies in Canada with resources which might help the country enhance its global activities and relations (including other countries’ diaspora in Canada, whether naturalised or not, Canadian minded populations overseas whether Canadian citizens or not and whether naturalised or Canadian born) significantly broadens the populations which diaspora strategies might conceivable engage with. The concept of the global citizen needs to be developed, sharpened and operationalised but it does present an internationally unique and politically progressive point of departure and provides Canada with an opportunity to contribute to as well as to draw from global dialogue in international best practice.
4. THE INSTITUTIONS AND STRATEGIC APPROACHES THROUGH WHICH COUNTRIES SEEK TO ENGAGE THEIR DIASPORAS

Whilst it is relatively easy to identify branches of state which deal with immigration, it is more difficult to establish who governs over matters of emigration. Cognate state departments and administrative units such as Departments of Foreign Affairs, Departments of Home Affairs, Departments of Heritage and Culture, and Enterprise and Development Agencies, devise and implement solutions to emigration problems normally in an ad hoc and isolated way. Gamlen (2008) develops the useful notion of the ‘emigrant state’ to capture the totality of the work these range of state actors perform. Diaspora strategies emerge when particular states decide it is necessary to firstly secure an overview of the range of actually existing public, private, and voluntary diasporic ties (to map the existing range of transnational connections) and secondly to articulate and enact a preferred orientation as to how these ties might best be developed. A diaspora strategy, it should be noted, does not necessarily demand the development of a coherent and formalized top-down, bureaucratically regulated, centralized and managerialist, blueprint. But it does imply a strategic understanding of the full extent of the emigrant state and the ways in which the emigrant state might be better deployed.

There exists a continuum of institutional innovation. Some states are content to map their emigrant state apparatus, to promote joined-up thinking and to leave each state department and administrative unit to its own devices. Other states provide protection for particular diaspora initiatives proposed by their various state departments and administrative units and police and regulate these infant strategies. More involved, yet other governments encourage and induce their various departments and administrative units to bring forth particular diaspora policies. A higher level of engagement comes when a state teaches, cultivates, nurtures, and re-energizes state departments and administrative units who are already pursuing particular diaspora engagements. Finally, more muscular states again further embark on a formal strategy of actively governing over their emigrant state, dedicating whole ministries, sections of state departments, or special purpose administrative units to the task of developing and implementing coherent diaspora strategies.

It is obvious why many governments might want to engage their diaspora, but why should state bodies intervene at all? What is the justification for state intervention and when might such intervention be productive? This is a question which has generated particular scrutiny in the Scottish case. According Rutherford (2009), intervention is particularly valuable when three particular types of ‘market failure’ occur: network effects, transaction costs/information failure, and externalities. Firstly, market failure occurs when projects are judged to be sufficiently risky or unproven to be tackled. Intervention to build diasporic networks can be justified if the cost of network establishment proves to be a disincentive for early adopters, and when networks only become viable when more established and mature. Governments can internalise the costs of network creation and shepherd these networks until they reach the critical size necessary to demonstrate their sustainability. Secondly, market failure can occur if transaction costs and the cost of
researching and gaining knowledge of opportunities are high. Governments can work to produce and share information and services to bring these costs down beneath the level at which they prove to be a disincentive. Finally, market failure on account of positive externalities occurs when projects produce both private and public goods, but where the profitability of the private good is not sufficient to encourage the private actor to initiate the project. Governments can invest where the aggregate good includes, but is larger than, benefits to private citizens.

State interventions can be represented in the continuum; absent, custodian, midwife, husbandry, and demiurge:

- **Absent** - the state leaves the formation of links between the homeland and the diaspora to the market or to autonomous social, cultural and political movements, with the diaspora self-organizing its engagement with its homeland.
- **Custodian** - the state nurtures, protects, regulates, and polices new and emerging diasporic connections.
- **Midwifery** - the state identifies potential engagements, champions/leaders and mobilizes and cultivates them but leaves ownership of initiatives in the hands of the diaspora.
- **Husbandry** - the state works with and re-energizes existing diaspora organisations and networks.
- **Demiurge** - the state directly creates and runs diasporic initiatives and networks, perhaps with the intention of letting the market assume responsibility at a later date.

Within Ireland, The Irish Abroad Unit, a division within the Department of Foreign Affairs, seeks to promote joined-up thinking and coordination across branches of the state for instance with respect to the diasporic relevant work of Enterprise Ireland, the Industrial Development Agency, The President’s Office, and other departments within the state. With respect to the policies of these agencies, the motif of the Irish state is ‘let a thousand flowers bloom’, with the state at best ‘lightly incubating’ existing initiatives or seeding new initiatives. The Irish schemes are slowly transferring to more managerialist interventions, especially with regards to accountability and transparency of spending, but there remains an underlying inclination to leave diaspora organizations and networks to run themselves, providing only minimal resources (basic funding, advice, speakers, etc) and only when an organization or network needs to be re-energized and requires the short-term backing of the Irish state.

A key weakness of the Armenian state in the years immediately following independence from the Soviet Union was the lack of capacity within the state apparatus. Accordingly, across the past decade there has emerged a concerted effort to build the Armenian state and undoubtedly the institutional capacity of the current state represents a momentous improvement on what the country inherited from the Soviet period. The limit of Armenia’s weak institutional capacity is especially evident when one considers the capacity of the Armenian state to engage, lever, and harness diasporic resources and expertise. Part of the challenge of developing a diaspora strategy then has been the creation of institutional capacity and structures within Armenia capable of extending existing ties and establishing new relationships with the diaspora. Initially this engagement was largely the preserve of the Ministry of
Foreign Affairs and to an extent, the Ministry for Economy. More recently in 2008 a new Ministry of Diaspora was established. This Ministry represents a dramatic development in state building in the sphere of diaspora engagement; a significant ramping up of what Armenia is capable of doing with its diaspora.

India has a well-developed diaspora strategy which is produced and managed by a dedicated Ministry of Overseas Indian Affairs (MOIA), which came into existence in May 2004 as the Ministry of Non-Resident Indians’ Affairs. Within the terminology of the Indian state, this Ministry has the status of a ‘Services’ Ministry. The Ministry is primarily responsible for all issues relevant to Overseas Indians, comprising Persons of Indian Origin (PIOs) and Non-Resident Indians (NRIs) which are not specifically allocated to other Ministries/Departments of the Government of India. Like Armenia, India has found it useful to erect a powerful and central state organ to oversee its ties with its diaspora and more specifically has adopted a highly interventionist posture, setting up schemes and managing programmes directly from New Delhi.

The Scottish Government’s International Projects Division – instituted by and guided by its International Framework published in 2008 – seeks to promote joined up thinking and coordination across branches of the state, for instance with respect to the diasporic relevant work of Scottish Enterprise, Scottish Development International, and VisitScotland. In 2009 the Scottish Government hosted a Scottish Diaspora Forum in which invited thought leaders were asked to propose bold new initiatives to better engage the Scottish Diaspora. In 2010 it published a well thought out plan and list of priorities. Whilst the International Projects Division performs more as nimble and flexible coordinator than as a key actor itself, and seeks to bring a range of agencies behind the plan, the specific Scottish schemes tend to be highly managerialist in nature. Whilst important exceptions exist, in the Scottish case, the state functions largely as the lead player in proposing, managing, and reviewing schemes. Indeed Scotland identifies itself as Europe’s leading pioneer in the development of formal and systematic state led diaspora strategies.

New Zealand’s diaspora strategy is coordinated and managed by Kea New Zealand, a non-for-profit organization which works in close relation with, but which exists independently from, government. Whilst the New Zealand state anticipates that as the strategy matures Kea will knit together with other expatriate initiatives (devised by other Ministries and Departments including, for example, the New Zealand Treasuries alumni networks scheme), to date Kea continues to dominate the field and is the lead player. As such, the New Zealand state operates with a light touch and has externalized diaspora strategizing. Kea was conceived and launched at the Knowledge Wave Conference in Auckland in August 2001. Initially funded through private philanthropy, it is now funded in descending order by the Government (Ministry of Economic Development and New Zealand Trade and Enterprise), the private sector, sponsorship, service fees, and membership fees (both corporate and individual). It has four full-time regional managers in the UK (London), Australia (Sydney), North America (New York), and China (Shanghai), and fourteen international chapters: Los Angeles, San Francisco, New York, Boston, London, Manchester, Paris, Amsterdam,
Dubai, Shanghai, Sydney, Melbourne, Brisbane, Vancouver.

China’s approach to its diaspora is being championed by the State Council’s General Office of Overseas Chinese affairs, the Standing Committee of the National People’s Congress, and the Political Consultation Conference. Within the Communist Party the Department of the Unification Front assumes primary responsibility. Whilst these various institutions promote dialogue with respect to how best to engage and cater for the overseas Chinese community, there exists no formal overarching diaspora strategy. Undoubtedly the objective of the Chinese authorities is to secure the loyalty of the overseas Chinese and to engender a sympathetic pro-Beijing, pro-socialist, but still modern and technologically aware diaspora. In spite of its centralist reputation, much of what the Chinese state does is mainly designed to support initiatives led by diasporic communities and to provide a macro-economic regulatory framework which incentivizes diasporic engagement. Whilst ultimately controlled by the Chinese Communist Party, the Chinese diaspora strategy is still surprisingly light touch.

**b) Which institution(s) within Canada should be tasked with the responsibility of formulating and overseeing a diaspora strategy and should a new institution be created for this purpose?**

International practice suggests that countries who are seeking to fortify and develop their relations with diasporic communities are viewing it as necessary to erect new institutional capacities to accomplish this task. Among the models of governance which are emerging are the creation of dedicated new Ministries, the establishment of diaspora units within Government departments, the establishment of nimble and flexible cross department working groups, and the outsourcing of diaspora strategy to voluntary and/or private sector groups. As a first step it would seem imperative that Canada maps its ‘emigrant state’ and reflects upon the fitness of purpose of its emigrant state. Moreover some diaspora strategies fail because governments seek to impose a fresh blueprint and set of structures on an already crowded landscape of organic transnational relations, without mapping these prior ties or working collaboratively with and alongside them. It would seem important that Canada fully understands its existing connections with its overseas communities. In our experience, governments are often unaware, and on occasions surprised and taken aback, with what exists already and what can be put offside and suffocated by new top down bureaucratic strategies. Critical market failures do occur and there is a role for states to intervene and sometimes to intervene in a muscular way. But the skill in formulating diaspora strategies pivots around strategic and timely state interventions. Whatever institution is given responsibility for formulating and overseeing a diaspora strategy for Canada, it is crucial that attention is given to the particular spaces in which any intervention might work and how intervention might work with and build upon actually existing transnational ties.
5. DIASPORA AND NATION BUILDING

Historically, diasporic communities have played an active and at times key role in the rise and fall of cultural and political nationalisms and nationalist movements in the homeland. This support has taken the form of leadership and organization, volunteering, moral and political solidarity, fundraising for political parties, the provision of armaments and explosives, and the dissemination of political propaganda. This is especially true of victim diaspora or diaspora whose history is fraught with the trauma of a natural or human disaster (earthquake, tsunami, hurricane, genocide, famine, warfare) and who reside in diaspora in exile with seemingly heightened patriotic fervour. Nation building continues to serve as an important progenitor of state interest in engaging diasporic communities. According to Lainer-Vos (2010) at a more substantial level building the nation has come to imply a simultaneous building of the nation at home and in diaspora. Here, renewed interest has been given to ‘recharging’ short term return visits, social and cultural activities, honours and awards systems, and communication and ICT links. Whilst this move might be read as a recognition that diasporic loyalty can no longer be taken for granted, a more profound interpretation points to a re-conceptualization of relationships which have hitherto been assumed to exist between nation and territory.

Of course the significance attached by long established nations to promoting the virtues of their national narrative and their values and beliefs within the international community continues unabated. But the twenty first century is also giving birth to a new generation of nation building projects which in turn are once again actively seeking to enlist diasporic support and to harness diasporic patriotism. Firstly, the legacy of the European colonial adventure in Africa, Asia, and Latin America continues to reverberate, in terms of the trials and tribulations of still vulnerable fledgling new states. Secondly, the collapse of the Soviet Union has resulted in, at times, volatile ethnic factionalism and in the creation of post-Soviet states in central and Eastern Europe. Thirdly, recent US foreign policy has created or is striving to create nation building in, among other places, Afghanistan and Iraq. Finally, successionist and independence movements continue to assert their right to self-determination in places such as the Balkans, Scotland, Northern Ireland, Quebec, Sri Lanka, and Palestine.

With respect to (but not confined to) these four contexts, the literature on diasporic intervention in state building has focused upon three central issues. Firstly, there has been considerable debate over the extent to which diasporas contribute more to conflict and political anarchy than to conflict resolution and purposeful statecraft (Shain and Barth 2003). Brinkerhoff (2009) argues that it is no longer possible to view diaspora as mere adjuncts to homeland conflicts and provides a valuable summary of the conditions in which diaspora might serve as ‘conflict entrepreneurs’, ‘competing interests’, or ‘contributors to stability and development’. Secondly, an alternative debate has focused upon the readiness of home states, institutionally and politically, to effectively interface with, and be engaged by, willing, motivated, and in some cases wealthy, diasporic sponsors. Freinkman’s (2002) study of the early post-Soviet Armenian state provides lessons both for willing diaspora groups (that they should seek suitable institutional forms before
engaging and investing) and home states (that without proper institutional frameworks much effort can be dissipated without effective results). Meanwhile Waterbury’s (2005) analyses of the appropriation of diaspora strategy by elites in post communist Hungary, and Mohan’s (2008) study of the Ghanaian government’s engagement of its diaspora points to the political sensitivities which need to be managed if diasporic communities are to be drawn into domestic nation building projects. Finally, not only do some states and political parties attempt to harness the energy of diasporic communities to bolster domestic political agendas and programmes, but so too diasporic populations are frequently enlisted to broker foreign policy, influence international relations, promote cultural values, and perform diplomatic functions, in their roles as advocates, activists, agitators and ambassadors of the nation.

A prerequisite for a successful diaspora strategy is a motivated diaspora, willing and minded to contribute to national development. Whilst perhaps historically taken for granted, the social and cultural condition, empathy, and inclination of diasporic communities is now emerging itself as an important arena for intervention. Diasporic patriotism varies in time and space, with the patriotic flame being doused and ignited by a variety of origin and destination specific triggers. But states can play a role in incubating, fostering and building diaspora social and cultural networks. Arguably, the nation needs to be strategically and consciously built in the diaspora first if the diaspora is to contribute to nation building in the homeland. Although at first glance a reasonably straightforward proposition, in fact such a project might imply and encourage a profound shift in the ways in which ‘nations’ and ‘territory’ are imagined. For Agnew (2005), contemporary interest in building nations at home and in diaspora points to a preparedness to de-territorialise the nation and to cast or re-territorialise the nation as a global network. Only a small number of countries have begun the task of thinking through the implications of this seismic shift in thinking about the relations which exist between geography, nations, and states. Ireland Armenia, Croatia and New Zealand are examples.

Projects designed to fortify and recharge national pride for, and patriotism towards, the homeland have made use of organized short-term visits. These visits are often managed and funded by governments and include visitations by more youthful cohorts for short periods lasting from a week to much longer periods. By following a set itinerary which includes formal schooling in the nations’ history and politics, visiting iconic places, participating in social and cultural activities including attending and celebrating religious festivals, exposure to oral history, and access to leading national politicians and celebrities, the objective is to produce a memorable visit which energize future diasporic leaders and which will sow the seeds for a lifelong commitment and loyalty. Two frequently cited and classic exemplars of the workings and effectiveness of organized short term visits to the homeland are the Taglit-Birthright Israel and MASA programmes, which repatriate Jewish Youth to Israel. The Know India Programme likewise provides diaspora youth with a three week internship with a view to promoting a new awareness of and interest in India.

Many diaspora groups have established homeland specific social, cultural and sporting clubs and networks, some accompanied with designated physical
infrastructure such as theatres, schools, museums, sporting arenas, and libraries, and governments often support these groups through direct and in-kind funding (such as supporting cultural visits by politicians, celebrities, national icons, sporting heroes, artists, writers and performers) as a way of maintaining cultural identity. Ireland, for example, funds creative artists to visit the diaspora, funds Irish sporting organizations overseas, and funds overseas Irish heritage resources such as the Kennedy Library in Boston. These supports are increasingly forming part of, and being coordinated through, national cultural and heritage strategies. Countries may also provide specific services relating to cultural identity. For example, India has set up a state-sponsored genealogy service ‘Tracing the Roots’ which engages a private company (Indiroots) to construct a family tree for a small fee. The Irish Department of Community, Rural and Gaeltacht Affairs supports the teaching of the Irish language at third-institutions outside of Ireland. Similarly, the Lithuanian government funds Lithuanian schools to teach the Lithuanian language and cultural heritage to the descendants of Lithuanian emigrants.

Some nations also make use of national honours and awards systems to build diasporic loyalty by recognising the contribution of individual diaspora members to the homeland and to society in general. Of course most nations have an official honours system through which normally civilians are recognised and rewarded for their contributions to the furtherment and betterment of the national cause. Some of these systems have sought to incorporate overseas citizens and more generally overseas non-nationals who have also served the nation with distinction. The French honours system is perhaps the most famous example; whilst awards to overseas citizens rarely afford such citizens with membership rights and entitlements enjoyed by French nationals, France does still regularly reward the achievements of such citizens in its principal honours: Légion d'honneur (Legion of Honour); L'Ordre National du Mérite (National Order of Merit); L'Ordre des Arts et des Lettres (The Order of Arts and Letters); Palmes académiques (Order of the Academic Palms); L’Ordre du Mérite Agricole (The Order of Agricultural Merit), and; L’Ordre du Mérite Maritime (The Order of Maritime Merit). More particularly, some nations have created an entirely new set of honours and awards for their diasporic population. For example, since 2003, the President of India has presented the Pravasi Bharatiya Samman Awards to up to 20 members of the Indian diaspora; the highest civilian honour which can be bestowed on overseas citizens. In 2006, KEA New Zealand started the World Class New Zealand Awards to honour New Zealanders making a significant international contribution in different spheres.

Building a sense of nationhood in a diaspora also necessitates opening up new dialogue with diasporic communities, increasingly through the use of ICT technologies. Some countries have set up formal arrangements of consultation with their diasporas. For example, Jamaica has established the Jamaican Diaspora Advisory Board. Its members are elected and it meets twice a year to discuss diaspora matters. In addition, a diaspora conference of invited delegates meets every two years, with regional conferences held in interregnum between the biennial Conferences. Similarly, Norway (Norgestinget), Finland (Ulkosuomalaisparlamentti), Sweden (Uelandssvenskarnas parlament), France (Assemblée des Français de l’étranger) and Switzerland (Organisation des Suisses de l’étranger) have recently established
expatriate parliaments to consult with their diasporas about domestic and diaspora matters. India has established the Prime Minister’s Global Advisory Council of Overseas Indians, and also hosts events to meet with its diaspora twice a year, in India in January and overseas each September.

Many countries seek to inform the diaspora as to what is happening in their home country through newsletters and websites. It should be noted that many of these initiatives are organic and are led by actors from the private and voluntary sector; others are state led. Barabanstv (2005) identifies more than 30 Chinese newspapers published in Europe alone, including the *European Times* (*ouzhoushibao*) (France), *Europe Daily* (*ouzhou ribao*) (France), *Chinese Communicator* (*huaqiao tongxun*) (the Netherlands), *United Business Paper* (*lianhe shangbao*) (Hungary), *Romanian Chinese* (*liulu huaren*) (Romania), *Chinese New Paper* (*huaxinbao*) (Spain), *Austrian Chinese* (*auhua*) (Austria). Web site portals, both state-sponsored (such as Connect2Canada) and run by NGOs or private organisations or even individuals (such as the Canadian Expatriate Network), detailing useful information to the diaspora in situ and also about the home country, are seen by many in the diaspora and those seeking to serve the diasporic community as vital infrastructure. Some of these portals are very broad in nature, often having a social networking facility. Increasingly, Facebook, Twitter, and LinkedIn, and derivate equivalent social networking tools are being deployed. In addition, many diaspora can also keep in contact with their homeland through broadcast media via satellite and Internet. Whilst there exist few state-sponsored free to air channels aimed specifically at the diaspora as a constituent group, the BBC, SKY, CNN, Bloomberg, Euronews, CCTV (China), NDTV24x7 (India), NHKWorldTV (Japan), Al Jazeera (Arab World) all play an important role. Meanwhile the Indian government produces a monthly e-magazine (*overaseandindian*). Likewise the Scottish government produces a quarterly e-magazine (*ScotlandNow*). In the Irish case, Emigrant News, an independent organisation provides a weekly news summary of Irish relevant news.

Armenia presents a classic example of a country which is seeking to refresh its national narrative but also to rebuild its national story for the twenty first century. The building the Armenian nation as a globally dispersed cultural and political community has emerged as central to the work of the new Armenian Ministry for Diaspora. Indeed arguably to date it has been the cultural fortification of Armenianess in the diaspora that has been the primary objective of the new Armenian Ministry for Diaspora. At the heart of the strategy has been the concept of the ‘Armenian World’. Rather than conceiving of Armenia as a small landlocked nation in the interior of the Caucasus, Armenia is now being imagined and invented as a globally networked nation which surpasses the boundaries of the state of Armenia itself. Armenia is keen to build the narratives of the Armenian World with due reverence for its history of trauma but also with respect to its potential to play a new role in the twentieth first century. In important ways the Ministry has been keen to help support the self organization of the diaspora and to avoid crowding into space which the diaspora already occupies and services itself. To gain some insights into its work it is worth noting some of the chief projects pursued in 2010 were:

- Development and implementation of the ‘Ari Tun’ program (periodic visits of Diaspora Armenian youth to Armenia)
• Development and implementation of the ‘One Nation, One Culture’ Pan-Armenian Cultural Festival
• Organizing professional forums and scientific conferences with Armenian themes
• Coordination and organizing of the contest for ‘Best Armenian School’ at the annual pan-Armenian award ceremony ‘for notable contributions to the preservation of Armenian identity’
• Organizing and conducting the ‘Our Greats’ program of events to pay homage to notable Diaspora Armenians
• Implementation of the Year of the Mother Language
• Organizing to provide public educational institutions and community organizations of the Diaspora with educational, children’s, fictional and scientific literature and Armenian emblems
• Implementation of efforts aimed at expanding the network of one-day schools, the ‘Sister Schools’ program
• Organizing efforts aimed at broadening educational opportunities for Diaspora Armenians studying at Armenian universities and intermediate vocational institutions
• “Establishment of an ‘Alley of Armenian Benefactors’ program
• Organizing ‘Armenia-Diaspora’ theme-based video-conferences and teleconferences
c) Should and can the Canadian government play an enhanced role in building the Canadianess of the Canadian diaspora and work to harness the Canadian diasporas a resource in the formulation of Canadian foreign policy and diplomacy?

An overly patriotic and militant diaspora can often prove to be both a resource and a problem for sending states. In spite of this or in some cases because of this, sending states are seeing virtue in culturally fortifying and nurturing their diasporas. Supporting diasporas culturally is rightly being seen by many as an essential prerequisite for other types of engagement and in particular economic engagement. The cultural underpins the economic, and countries that seek to lever and harness their diaspora for economic benefit only without first attending to the cultural inclinations of their overseas populations will find their strategy quickly foundering. Crudely, if people do no feel Canadian their chances of playing for Team Canada are lessened. Building the diaspora culturally requires a recasting of Canada as both a) a territorialized nation in North America and b) a globally networked nation present in countries across the globe. Whilst building the nation among diaspora groupings has emerged as a central theme of many country’s diaspora strategies arguably it is in those nations who have suffered a history of trauma and those diaspora that consider themselves to be victim diaspora that the greatest success has been enjoyed to date. Although it is not always the case, it is diasporic populations that are already held together by virulent ethnic nationalism that present the most receptive audiences for such programmes. Arguably the Canadian diaspora is held together by a more diluted set of national narratives which pivot around varieties of civic nationalism. One need only compare the global celebrations which accompany St Patrick’s Day and Canada Day to appreciate the import of this point. This does not need imply that the patriotism of the Canadian diaspora is insignificant nor that work can be done to fortify the Canadian mindedness of the diaspora nor that the Canadian diaspora and more broadly Canada’s global citizens cannot play a role in promoting Canadian values around the globe. But it does suggest that the Canadian approach will need to think of the complex constituencies it needs to speak to, the varieties of Canadian national identities which already exist, and the kinds of social and cultural projects which are likely to resonate best with the wide range of overseas Canadian communities which exist.
6. DIASPORA AND DEVELOPMENT

Growing interest in diaspora strategy can be traced in part to new thinking in Development Studies regarding the role of emigration in the development of sending countries. Historically, emigration has been viewed as a barometer of the success or failure of national economic strategies; the greater the loss of talent the more impoverished the strategy. Policy interventions have tended to focus narrowly upon arresting the ‘brain drain’ and fostering return migration, and increasing the scale and improving the deployment of migrant remittances. Since the early 1990s, however, countries of origin have begun to enquire more seriously into possible ways in which the energy and talent of émigrés might be levered and harnessed from diasporic locations. Now, attention is being given to increasing philanthropic donations, generating ‘roots’ or return tourism, and building business networks and diasporic investment. Useful reviews of the changing status of emigration in debates on the competing virtues of national development strategies can be found in Lowell and Gerova (2004), Larner (2007), Leclerk and Meyer (2007), Solimano (2008), Faist (2008), Dewind and Holdaway (2008) and Bakewell (2009). The World Bank, through its Knowledge for Development Programme, has played a key role in this transition in thinking (Kutznesov 2006). Meanwhile, Analee Saxenian’s (2006) The New Argonauts: Regional Advantage in the Global Economy, has proven seminal in foregrounding the role of brain circulation and business networks in transferring technology and entrepreneurship from Silicon Valley to emerging regions in China, India, Taiwan, Israel, and more recently Armenia.

From at least 1945, the movement of skilled labour from developing to developed countries, invariably referred to as a ‘brain drain,’ has attracted much concern. From the late 1960s onwards, peripheral economies within the developed world also began to develop an interest in the meaning and negative consequences of out migration. The debate between Johnson and Patinkin in 1968 announced a new moment of doubt and questioning (Kutznetsov 2006). Johnson sought to outline a Cosmopolitan Liberal Model of free international migration which lamented unwarranted alarm over emigration from the global south and which championed the counterclaim that the aggregate welfare of all could only be enhanced if all barriers to movement were lifted. Pantikin, in contrast, insisted upon preserving a Nationalist Model of restricted and controlled procurement of skilled labour from developing countries and foregrounded the damage which the flight of talent inflicted upon the development prospects of the global south. It is clear that this debate rumbles on to this day.

In their review of the impacts of skilled emigration on developing countries, Findlay and Powell (2001) seek to clarify the specific circumstances under which the loss of talent might exert a medium to long term drag on economic growth. They argue that limiting emigration and promoting return migration remains an important policy option and call on both sending and receiving counties (through bilateral and multi-lateral agreements) to work to: ensure that some migrant streams are truly only temporary; restrict migration from especially vulnerable and at-risk countries; increase accountability among recruitment specialists and employers; establish protocols for the treatment of foreign workers, and; facilitate return migration. Programmes designed to
stem emigration and encourage brain incubation or circulation remain an important part of some countries’ engagement with their diaspora. Terrazas (2010) provides a useful overview of programmes which seek to harness the energy of diasporic volunteers even if only for a brief duration. At the supra-national scale the United Nations’ Volunteer Programme (UNVP), the International Labour Office’ TOKTEN (Transfer of Knowledge Through Expatriate Nationals) initiative, and the International Organisation of Migration’s (IOM) Migration for Development in Africa (MIDA) scheme attempt likewise to fuse the diasporic appetite to volunteer with schemes designed to lubricate temporary return.

Remittances can be defined as private or person-to-person transfers from migrant workers to recipients in the worker’s country of origin. In 2010 worldwide remittances flows were estimated at $440 billion, $325 billion of which were transfers to developing countries (World Bank 2011). To compare, recorded remittances to developing countries were nearly three times the volume of Official Development Assistance (Aid), almost equivalent to flows of Foreign Direct Investment (FDI), and almost four times the amount of private loans and portfolio equity (World Bank 2011). Moreover, remittance flows to developing countries have proven comparatively resilient during the global economic downturn, falling only by 5.5% in 2009 and recovering to 2008 levels in 2010 (World Bank 2011, see also the Hudson Institute 2010). In comparison, in 2009 FDI flows fell by 40%, whilst private debt and portfolio equities fell by 46% (World Bank 2011). Remittance flows to developing countries are expected to increase by 6.2 percent in 2011 and 8.1 percent in 2012 (World Bank 2010). The United States’ remains by far the largest source of outward flows, followed by Saudi Arabia, Switzerland, the Russian Federation, Germany and Italy. In 2010, India, China, Mexico, the Philippines, and France were the top recipient countries (World Bank 2011). Currently, sending countries are attempting to increase gains from remittances through: a) lowering the cost of transfers and increasing their security; b) extending transfer services to communities which are ‘unbanked’; c) encouraging collective remittances by providing migrant organizations with technical and organizational support, matching funds, marketing skills, and other business services; d) stabilising exchange rates; e) encouraging more productive uses of remittances, and; f) improving the functioning of the market for remittance services (Newlands and Patrick 2004, World Bank 2007).

Philanthropy can be defined as the private and voluntary donation of resources for charitable and public good. In order of numerical importance, philanthropic giving is coordinated and promoted by Private and Voluntary Organisations (PVOs), Religious Organizations, Corporations, Foundations, Volunteer Citizens, and University and College Alumni Associations (Hudson Institute 2010). In 2008, US philanthropic donations amounted to $37.3 billion. Whilst some forms of charitable giving have proven resilient during the recession, it is clear that philanthropy which is based upon investments in the stock market and interest on assets has proven to be less robust during the global economic downturn than remittances (Hudson Institute 2010). Johnson (2007) has drawn attention to diaspora philanthropy as an important subset of all philanthropic giving. She identifies two types of diaspora philanthropy, which she terms diaspora associations and diaspora foundations. Diaspora associations are
organizations run by and for diaspora groupings who provide philanthropic support directly and indirectly to their members; the most famous example would be the Hometown Association (HTA) model, especially as managed in Mexico. Diaspora Foundations are generally established to facilitate charitable giving to a specific country region of the world (normally the homeland) and include such foundations as the American India Foundation, the Ireland Funds, the Ayala Foundation, the Brazil Foundation, and Give2Asia. Aikins, Sands and White (2009) claim that diasporans contribute to philanthropy especially: by providing direct gifts of cash, stock or property; by making wills and bequests; by promoting specific projects and acting as mentors to them; by encouraging governments to create more conducive conditions for giving, particularly in relation to the taxation environment; and by investing in capacity building in nonprofit organizations thereby assisting the nonprofit sector to adopt best practice in novel and increasingly important practices such as venture philanthropy, social entrepreneurship, philanthrocapitalism, etc. (see also the policy prescriptions offered by Newland, Terrazas, and Munster, 2010)

Tourism is now the world’s fourth largest industry (UNWTO 2010a). Between 2000 and 2008, the number of international tourists visiting developing and emerging countries grew from 259 million to 424 million, whilst the number of tourists visiting advanced economies increased from 423 million to 495 million (UNWTO 2010b). Tourists visits suffered a decline of 4% in 2009, but have risen again by 5% in 2010 and are projected to rise again by 4% in 2011 (UNWTO 2010a). Return visits by diasporic populations to homelands constitute an un-quantified, but significant section of this lucrative market. According to Newland and Taylor (2010) diaspora tourism includes a broad spectrum of return visits incorporating: medical tourism, business-related tourism, heritage (or ‘roots’) tourism, exposure or ‘birthright’ tours, education tourism, VIP tours, and peak experience tours. The consumption practices of diaspora tourists differs from that of all tourists and tends to generate especially high levels of demand for often labour intensive or artisanal products. As a consequence diaspora tourism has the potential to impact particularly favourably on local businesses and local communities. The tourist sector also provides opportunities for diasporic populations to invest in tourism facilities and to open new and perhaps less well-known tourist destinations to wider audiences. For Newland and Taylor (2010) the central policy challenges presented by diaspora tourism include: providing technical support throughout the value chain; easing the flow of people and goods across borders (in particular through user friendly visa schemes); supporting research, training, and policy development for diaspora tourism, trade, and heritage sites; supporting diaspora specific marketing and branding efforts; and identifying opportunities for high value-added trade and tourism investments.

Perhaps the most sought after and certainly the most discussed contribution of diasporic communities to the development of homelands is in the area of business investment and business networks. Much of the recent excitement has stemmed from Saxenian’s (2006) pioneering work on ethnic communities in Silicon Valley - Chinese, Indian, Taiwanese, Israeli, and more recently Armenian - who are exploiting their localized social and business webs and tying them into homeland public and private initiatives. A new breed of ICT
engineers and entrepreneurs are transferring technology and capital to homelands which are now assuming new roles in the global technology business ecosystem. Saxenian’s work has served as a catalyst for new interest in the role of diasporic groups in providing knowledge, mentoring, access to markets, technology, foreign direct investment, venture capital, and capital and portfolio investment (including the purchase of national solidarity bonds) to homelands.

Much of the existing literature on diasporic business impacts on homeland economies makes use of the idea of business networks, formally and informally constituted webs of connections and ties between diasporans and key actors in the homeland. Diaspora business networks are overseas networks that mobilise the skills, expertise, contacts, knowledge, business acumen, and financial and political resources to benefit the local and global diasporas as well as the homeland. Most networks are relatively new, perhaps less than a decade old and rely heavily on internet technologies, especially social networking media. Networks vary in their institutional origins (some have grown organically whilst others have been manufactured by homeland states), governance and source of funding (one or other or all of state, NGO, and privately run and financed), sector (some are professional networks which are not sector specific, others are targeted towards specific sectors), and geographical extent (some have regional headquarters and chapters in many countries of the world, others are based only in a single country). Some countries privilege a single network, others benefit from the presence of a range of different networks. Examples of the various types and functions of networks can be witnessed in GlobalScot (Scotland), ChileGlobal (Chile), Kea New Zealand (New Zealand), Advance (Australia), Irish Technology Leadership Group (Ireland), the 60 plus independent, networks supported by Enterprise Ireland (Ireland), The Indus Entrepreneurs (India), and ArmenTech (Armenia).

A number of useful typologies of diaspora business networks exist. According to Kuznetsov and Sabel (2006) there are six potential diaspora networks: a) Top executives networks where senior executives of TNCs use their positions to channel company investment into source nations; b) Mentoring/venture capital networks where diaspora members help to finance and guide new companies and companies seeking to globalize from countries of origin; c) Investors networks where diasporans exploit their knowledge of source countries to make smart investments; d) Strategic direction setting networks where diasporic celebrities and captains of industry join think tanks and consultation groups to advise and energize national economic strategies; e) Return networks designed to simulate and lubricate the repatriation of talented diasporic groups, and; f) Outsourcing networks where disporeans who occupy senior positions in TNCs outsource work to SMEs in countries of origin.

Newland and Tanaka (2010) provide an equally useful taxonomy of diasporic business networks, based upon the degree of passivity or activity these networks display. From most passive, this taxonomy consists of: a) networking organizations which provide fora for networking and knowledge sharing; b) mentoring organizations which match SMEs who are seeking to globalize with experienced business leaders in diaspora, often located in target markets; c) training organizations which enlist diasporic support in the training and skilling of budding business entrepreneurs; d) investment organizations which provide
capital for company start ups and on an ongoing bases, and e) venture capital/partnership organizations where diasporic investors assume a heavy and hands on role in companies into which they invest.

Terrazas (2010) provides an informative overview of actual and potential ways in which diaspora (might) contribute to homeland development through strategic investment in capital markets (portfolio investment). According to Terrazas (2010) five existing vehicles are proving effective: deposit accounts denominated in local and foreign currency; the securitization of remittance flows allowing banks to leverage remittance receipts for greater lending; transnational loans to diaspora groupings to allow them to purchase real estate and housing in their source countries and; diaspora bonds to facilitate long-term state borrowing on improved conditions, and; diaspora mutual funds which mobilize pools of individual investors for collective investment in corporate and sovereign debt and equity. Terrazas (2010) also proposes that additional vehicles for investment are possible including issuing debt to sub-national governments, developing diaspora private equity funds to harness the managerial expertise of diasporeans, and mobilising institutional investors who manage diasporeans insurance and pension payments. Terrazas (2010) concludes that building and forging trust with capital markets is an essential prerequisite for the effective operation of these vehicles and recommends that home nations align their financial regulations and practices with international best practice and hire from pools of diaspora employed in the financial services sectors in key business centres.

The Irish state has invested heavily and successfully in seeking inward investment and building business partnerships with the Irish diaspora globally. The Industrial Development Agency (IDA) with 14 offices outside of Ireland, is responsible for the attraction and development of foreign investment in Ireland. While it targets any company which might potentially locate in Ireland, it has a successful track record of recruiting businesses owned and/or run by Irish or Irish-descent entrepreneurs and managers. Enterprise Ireland with 31 offices outside of Ireland, is the state agency responsible for the development and promotion of the Irish business sector and in assisting international companies and entrepreneurs who are searching for Irish suppliers or are interested in investing in Irish companies. At present, Enterprise Ireland supports, through in-kind or financial aid, over sixty Irish business networks around the world with over 30,000 members. These networks are used to support the work of these members whether they are located in Ireland or not, but are also used strategically to help market Irish business and products, to enable Irish companies to expand into new territories and markets, and to encourage inward investment into Ireland. Unlike other countries who have placed emphasis on developing a single elite business network of high-level achievers amongst the diaspora, Ireland has adopted a much more plural approach that aims to foster a number of business networks and to grow a wide base of contacts and expertise (although it has recently established the Global Irish Economic Forum, which is an elite network). Some of these were initially seeded by Enterprise Ireland such as Techlink-UK and Biolink Ireland-USA and others were started by the diaspora (such as the new Irish Technology Leadership Group). In the main, networks are owned and run by their members and function as social/business networking sites, many of
whom also organise regular face-to-face meetings.

KEA New Zealand is single, pan-global network with site-specific chapters and sector-focused sub-networks. Kea is a quasi-autonomous NGO organization that seeks to build broad, global networks of professional people living overseas. Established in 2001, KEA New Zealand has 25,000 subscribers in over 174 countries as of 2011. It has 14 international chapters in 8 countries, and employs four fulltime regional managers to conduct its operations in different parts of the world. Its mission is to ‘connect New Zealand with its large global talent community’ and to ‘contribute to the growth, development, and future prosperity of New Zealand by sharing knowledge, contacts and opportunities’ with its diaspora. In 2007, KEA New Zealand launched ‘World Class New Zealand,’ a programme that aims to identify world class role models with key business and enterprise skills, to facilitate contact between these role models and New Zealand businesses, and to build new international networks and partnerships. In addition, it seeks to access and share knowledge with these individuals through World Class New Zealand Summits – essentially high level think tank meetings – held in different countries around the world and designed to contribute to domestic and diaspora policy development. Initially established by two individuals with private funding, Kea is now funded through a mix of state grants, private sector donations and membership fees.

A critical part of Scotland’s Global Connections Strategy, GlobalScot is an elite, global business network composed of invited, high achieving members of the Scottish diaspora (almost 50% of GlobalScot members operate at company Chairperson, CEO or President level) established and managed by Scottish Enterprise. GlobalScot currently has over 600 members in Europe, Middle East and Africa (221), USA (212), Asia (104), and Scotland (80). These members have experience in the key targeted sectors: Digital Markets and Enabling Technologies (81), Life Sciences (99), Business Services (87), Financial Services (78), Energy (67), Food and Drink (22), Government (10), and Tourism (12). The scheme works by partnering GlobalScot members with Scottish companies, with the former providing mentoring, advice, contacts and so on to the latter in order to help them expand their business globally. A more recent development has been the Saltire Foundation that enables selected, young business people to undertake placements in GlobalScot companies as a way of kick-starting or advancing their business careers.

Notwithstanding aspirational claims and lofty ambitions, it has to be remembered that research into the economic resources and opportunities which sending countries might procure from diasporic communities is only in its infancy. Some examples provide a flavour of early findings. Nielsen and Riddle (2007) examined why members of diaspora populations invest in their homelands. They observed that intra-diaspora cultural differences, support for diaspora organizations, and three types of investment expectations, - financial, social, and emotional - were key to understanding migrant motivations. In their study of Chinese migrants in Australia, Tung and Chung (2010) show that Australian companies with operations in greater China, who were either owned by or who offered strategic management positions to Chinese immigrants tended to have more substantial investments, with higher resource commitments (wholly owned subsidiaries,
joint ventures) and to enjoy improved performance. Meanwhile Agrawal et al.’s (2010) study of the impact of emigration from India on domestic innovation within Indian companies concludes that innovation rates among returning Indian émigrés is no greater than among those who stayed put, that knowledge transfer from Indian diasporans is not sufficient to offset the losses incurred by emigration, that diasporic knowledge transfer has greater benefits only for high value added innovations, and therefore that skilled emigration has a generally harmful effect on the Indian economy. Leblang (2010) meanwhile provides evidence that even after controlling for intervening variables, connections between migrants residing in investing countries and their home country do influence patterns of global investment by reducing both transactional and information costs. This conclusion is equally true of capital or portfolio investment as it is for Foreign Direct Investment.
d) How can the Canadian diaspora be harnessed so as to improve the competitiveness of Canadian business’ and to stimulate Canadian economic development?

With specific respect to Canada’s own development and competitiveness in the global economy it would seem that greatest attention might be paid to the potential offered by business networks. Arguably remittances from overseas Canadians to Canada are not especially significant beyond a number of isolated cases. Certainly fostering return migration (brain circulation) remains a live policy issue; philanthropy, especially with respect to University Alumni networks is important, and; there is scope to think about promoting return or roots tourism (not least medical tourism). But the more pressing question would seem to be: is Canada doing enough to harness its overseas populations in the service of the globalization of Canadian business and might now be a moment when a new business network or set of networks might be more consciously created or crafted. To be sure formal and organized Canadian relevant business networks exist in many diaspora centres, not least in New York, Florida, Silicon Valley, Shanghai, Beijing and Hong Kong. And there exists a dense collage of hometown business, trade and investment networks consisting of variously formalized, largely covert, and densely meshed webs of family firms – including the ‘bamboo networks’ which link Canada with Hong Kong China, Indonesia, Malaysia, the Philippines, Singapore, Taiwan, Thailand, and China – which need to be better understood and nurtured. But Canada does not have one flagship global business network or an approach to birthing and/or nurturing a series of such networks and there is scope to consider if the introduction of such a network or networks might be merited.

The concept of the Global Citizen provides Canada with an opportunity to think about how its approach to other countries’ diaspora who dwell in Canada might be playing an important role in shaping their development. This is of particular importance in the case of developing countries. In promoting the concept of the ‘Global Citizen’ the Canadian government might wish to reflect upon its strategies towards the recruitment of talent from the global south, how it might work in a limited number of strategic priority areas to improve remittances and their effectiveness, how philanthropy from Canada raised by diasporic groups might be better routed home, and how its tourist practices carries implications for destination regions. Developing strategies in these important areas will not only promote the concept that Canada is acting responsibly and ethically in global affairs; it will also contribute to Canadian diplomacy in and relations with important sending countries.
7. DIASPORA AND CITIZENSHIP

According to the World Bank (2010) there currently exists 215.8 million migrants dwelling beyond their countries of first citizenship, approximately 3.2% of world population. Only 16.3 million or 7% of total immigrants are refugees. The top ten emigration countries in order of significance are Mexico, India, the Russian Federation, China, Ukraine, Bangladesh, Pakistan, the United Kingdom, the Phillipines and Turkey. The top immigration destinations are the United States, followed by the Russian Federation, Germany, Saudi Arabia, and Canada. Interestingly the volume of migration between developing countries remains larger than movements from developing countries to high income OECD countries. Whilst still remaining a small proportion of the global population, population emigration is of sufficient scale that it is presenting real challenges to models and systems of citizenship which are in operation in both sending and destination countries.

The concept of citizenship, of course, has a long and fraught history. Our interest is principally upon the legal status and associated rights and obligations both sending and host governments bestow on migrant populations. These rights and obligations incorporate civil (legal protection, guarantee of freedoms, security), political (voting and political participation), social (social security, education, housing, and health services) and economic (work and taxation) spheres. Fox (2005) and Bloemraad, Korteweg, and Yurdakul (2008) provide useful overviews of the implications of large scale migration for traditional models of citizenship. Three concepts would seem particularly important today: post national citizenship, dual or multiple citizenship, and flexible citizenship. Postnational citizenship (also referred to as Cosmopolitan Citizenship) refers to the growing importance of supra-national institutions (for example, the United Nations or the EU) in the making and defending of citizen rights. With the rise to prominence of global governance, citizen rights accrue to persons and not to residents of particular territories. Dual or multi-citizenship (also referred to as Transnational Citizenship) refers to the ascription of various kinds of citizenship to migrants in both the sending country and one or more destination country. In the past decade, there has been a proliferation of countries who are now prepared to offer citizenship to migrants without requiring them to renounce or annul their citizenship status in their countries of origin (see Macklin and Crépeau 2010 for a review of global practice) The concept of flexible citizenship, coined by Aihwa Ong (1999), was introduced to capture the instrumental and strategic approaches to acquiring multiple citizenship which marked hyper-mobile and elite Chinese entrepreneurs and business leaders who circulated transnationally in South East Asia specifically. Once thought of as a profoundly significant and revered prize, and highly charged statement of the extent of migrant integration into a new host society, according to Ong the hyper-mobility of contemporary capital has produced an associated ‘cultural logic of transnationality’, which in turn has radically transformed the meanings of citizenship and the methods through which such citizenship is earned and used. For some, the normative implications of the growing prominence of flexible citizenship merit a response. Should migrants be awarded citizenship cheaply if it is a mere lubricant to their business operations?
Sending countries must first consider the citizenship rights and obligations they are to apply to overseas citizens. Four issues are at stake. Firstly, embassy and consular services provide a first line of defense and assistance, and the geography, resourcing and remit of these services needs continual updating. Secondly, states are confronted with the question of the extent to which they are to continue to provide and extend civil, political, social, and economic rights to overseas citizens, for how long after departure, in what form, and to what degree. Thirdly, the question of raising taxes on overseas emigres is important. To date only the United States’ (although note the obligations assumed by certain members of the Israeli diaspora) taxes its citizens on income created irrespective of their location of residence and, even in this case, a number of exemptions and exceptions are possible. But other taxes related to remittances, philanthropy, capital investment, pensions, savings, inheritance and foreign direct investment are levied more universally. Finally, there exists the possibility of creating new models of citizenship specifically for overseas populations and indeed for any population claiming ancestral ties no matter how distant. These models provide a graduated diminution in rights from tangible to symbolic.

Perhaps the question of voting rights for overseas citizens is the most sensitive example of the difficulties which countries face when extending citizenship beyond national territorial borders. The International IDEA Handbook (Idea 2007) provides an authoritative and comprehensive global analysis of the voting entitlements of expatriates and prevailing electoral systems in most nation states (see also Kull’s 2008 commentary). Attention is given to four kinds of election: the principal legislative elections; presidential elections; referendums; and sub-national elections. This study concluded that approximately 115 countries extend a significant enfranchisement. Some of the countries that allow their citizens abroad to vote include Italy, France, Australia, New Zealand, the US, Britain, the Philippines and Mexico. Countries that, like Ireland, do not allow their emigrants to vote include India, Hungary, South Africa, Zimbabwe, El Salvador and Nepal. Most of the nations who allow external voting promoted equal voting status for everyone, but a minority placed restrictions on voting or weighted migrants votes differently based upon migrants intentions to return permanently and/or the time which had elapsed since departure. A range of voting methods are employed; in some cases emigrants can only vote if they return home to cast their preference, others allow for postal ballots (post, fax, and e-voting), others accept voting by proxy, whilst others again organise for citizens to vote in person at consulates or embassies. Eleven countries (Croatia, France, Italy and Portugal, Algeria, Angola, Cape Verde and Mozambique Colombia, Ecuador and Panama) adopted electoral systems which permitted expatriates to elect their own representatives to the national upper and lower parliaments.

The question of extending citizenship rights to diasporic groups carries important fiscal and geopolitical implications for sending nations. Important sensitivities exist and must be kept in mind. On gaining independence a key task for the new Armenian state was to clarify who within the former Soviet Armenia and who within the various Soviet Republics might be afforded Armenian citizenship. The outcome was predicated upon the assumption that those who were to be allowed to hold citizenship of the new Armenia could not at the same time hold citizenship of other states. Dual
citizenship was to be rendered unlawful. In November 2005 a constitutional amendment was passed by referendum, lifting the constitutional ban on dual-citizenship from Armenian law. This was followed in 2008 with the introduction of a law (‘On Citizenship’) legalizing a citizen’s right to be a citizen both of the Republic of Armenia and another state. At the time of the passing of the law in 2008, the Armenian Revolutionary Federation (Dashnaksutyun) were the most vociferous advocates within the diaspora backing the extension of citizenship rights to diasporic communities. They argued that it was impossible to seek to harness the resources, expertise, loyalty and lobbying capacity of overseas Armenians if such Armenians were at the same time considered to be somehow less Armenian than Armenians who live in the homeland. Among those who remained fearful of the implications of the extension of citizenship rights to the diaspora were the leadership of the Armenian Pan-National Movement (HHSh), the Party of former President Ter-Petrosian. For the HHSh dual citizenship is potentially both ‘extremely dangerous’ and fraught with ‘numerous risks’. Critics of dual citizenship fret about the potential consequences of widening access to citizenship for political sovereignty, national security (not least with respect to the ongoing conflict over Nagorno-Karabakh), National Military Service obligations, and the meaning and status of Armenian ethnicity (Antaramian 2006). Balancing the desire to involve the diaspora as much as possible in Armenian affairs whilst at the same time preserving the territorial sovereignty and integrity of the democratic system within Armenia itself presents the key challenge.

Diaspora strategies also must consider the promotion and supporting of claims to citizenship and entitlements which émigrés make in destination countries. Newland (2010) provides a panoramic overview of diaspora advocacy and lobby groups who serve as advocates for migrants needs with respect to citizenship status. These groups actively organize and participate around lobbying and advocacy work, lawsuits, fundraising, electoral politics, media control and information dissemination and demonstrations. A key challenge for governments is how best to reach and support vulnerable overseas groups whether directly or via pre-existing community, voluntary, and cultural advocacy organisations. Clearly, working with existing groups has the benefit of harnessing local knowledge and experience. Occasionally, however, investing in prior advocacy infrastructure merely reproduces the status quo, adds fuel to petty turf conflicts, and generates inefficiencies. The Lithuanian government through the Department of National Minorities and Lithuanians Living Abroad, the Chilean government through DICOEX, and the Irish Government through the Irish Abroad Unit, provide concrete examples of the ways in which source nations manage these tensions so as to ensure that migrants know and receive their local rights and entitlements in the host country.

The Department of National Minorities and Lithuanians Living Abroad (DNMLLA) takes a very proactive role in safeguarding and promoting the identity of the Lithuanian community overseas. Its target markets are Lithuanians living in ‘Lithuanian’ Poland, Belarus, and Kalingrad Oblast, exiles from World War II and from the rule of the Soviet Union and their descendants now living in former USSR countries, the ‘classical’ Lithuanian diaspora in the USA, Canada, Australia, and New Zealand, and finally the post-accession migrants now living in Britain, Ireland, Norway, and Spain.
Through the strategies of a) *Long Term State Relations with Lithuanians Living Abroad (2008-2020)*, and b) *The Inter-Institutional Program for Cooperation with Lithuanian Communities Abroad for the Years 2008-2012*, Lithuania is seeking to preserve and build patriotism towards Lithuania, Lithuanian education, language, and culture, and the image of Lithuania overseas. In so doing, it aims to promote awareness of and protect the welfare rights of Lithuanian citizens in destination countries (ensuring that they secure access to the services they are entitled to). What makes this approach so interesting is the fact that the Department is simultaneously responsible for overseeing foreign-born minorities in Lithuania as well as Lithuanian citizens overseas. Coupling the two in this way provides for expertise and an elevated degree of sensitivity which might otherwise have been lacking.

In acting as and supporting advocates, activists, agitators, and ambassadors of diasporic communities, sending countries also need to confront one important limit to diaspora strategy. If handled clumsily diaspora strategy presents a threat to the sovereignty of host countries who face the prospect of foreign interference in their internal political affairs. This issue has become particularly pronounced in the Netherlands where Dutch multicultural policy has been strained by claims of Armenian and Turkish interference in the formulation of law around the denial of genocide, and Moroccan support for the civil and religious rights of the Moroccan Islamic population (Dijkink and Van der Welle 2009). But as noted, some nations who play host to sizeable diasporic populations are themselves seeking to exploit the knowledge, contacts, linguistic skills, and cultural insights of these populations to further improve their own global diplomatic and foreign policy interventions. Diasporic strategies which lobby for migrant rights and who seek to resource diasporic groupings and who act as lobbyists are likely to be most effective if they work in tandem with such host strategies.
e) What challenges does the Canadian diaspora present to Canadian citizenship policy and how should Canadian approaches to citizenship respond?

For sending states, the question of extending citizenship rights to overseas groups risks exposing them to unmanageable fiscal pressures (commitments which are difficult to service), domestic political risks (allowing diasporic groups to shape election outcomes or gain access to services without taxation), and diplomatic and geopolitical strains (more porous borders, being seen to intervene on behalf of citizens in countries where that intervention is not welcome and is likely to breach important relations). For some, such risks are especially acute in Canada because a proportion of its emigrant population are former immigrants and now naturalized Canadians. This has led on the one hand to a set of benign policies which on occasions have unconsciously served to discourage and distance diaspora groups. More worryingly on other occasions elevated fear has led to a defensive atmosphere in which restricting and policing Canadian citizenship more rigorously has taken precedence over widening access to citizenship. But it is obvious that any project which seeks to build new relationships between sending states and diasporic populations will only be sustainable if both groups feel they have a meaningful stake in the project and will enjoy mutual benefits from ensuring its success. Armenia demonstrates the importance of getting this balance correct. Countries around the world are wrestling with the problem of formulating a progressive and yet secure, operational and defensible dual citizenship policy and few seem to have found a formula that might attract the accolade of best practice. Perhaps India provides Canada with models of citizenship specifically designed for overseas groups, Ireland demonstrates how welfare relief from a sending country might reach directly into diasporic communities, and the Lithuanian case exemplifies how strong lobbying for overseas citizens to ensure they secure their rights and entitlements in host countries can be effective. Canada’s challenge is to see citizenship policy in the round, and as part of a wider set of debates about Canada-diaspora relations. Arguably nation building and the cultural fortification of any diaspora, and how countries deal with the citizenship rights bestowed on diasporic members, are integral to contributions which that diaspora might make to national economic development. In addition, both progressive citizenship law and productive and mutually beneficial development projects can contribute in both direct and indirect ways to the goal of nation building in diaspora. Finally, both nation building exercises and developmental initiatives set the vital context in which debates over limiting and extending citizenship to overseas populations take place. In seeking to recover the ‘lost Canadians’ it is imperative that Canada does not unwittingly lose its ‘found Canadian’ and ‘affinity Canadian’ constituencies.
8. CONCLUSION

Diaspora strategy is rapidly emerging as an important new policy field for nation-states that have experienced significant out-migration, often over several generations. A growing number of countries are expressing an interest in revisiting and rebuilding ties with their overseas populations and diaspora strategy is becoming something of a central priority for many governments today. A diaspora strategy provides a means for states to develop and maintain significant relationships with overseas citizens, descendants and ancestors and other friendly constituencies for the mutual benefit of both the sending state and the diaspora. It is a policy field whose time has come and it is possible to see the rise to prominence of such strategies as deriving from the ways in which they provoke, enliven and bring to the fore three contemporary debates which go to the heart of national governance in a globalized world: the global competitiveness of national economies; the building of new nations on both a territorial and a de-territorial and networked bases, and; the development of models of citizenship fit for purpose for the twenty first century. It is clear that there is a wide range of different institutions, strategies, policies, programmes, and schemes being developed and implemented across countries dependent on aspiration, context and circumstance. These differences notwithstanding, through joint ‘policy transfer’ workshops, seminars, publications, and conferences there is emerging a sharing of experience and an ongoing global dialogue as to the optimum design and implementation of diaspora strategies.

It is evident that Canada is joining the international debate on diaspora strategy at least a decade behind other pioneering nations. This can be to its advantage as vital lessons can and are being learned as to pros and cons of different approaches, and Canada does not have to reinvent the wheel. Moreover, there would appear to be little institutional legacy or hangover that might serve as an impediment to the development of innovative, creative, lateral, and novel programmes; in some ways Canada is beginning with a blank slate and can erect new institutions, frameworks, strategies and programmes without the friction of history bearing on it. Canada then is starting its journey from a unique and potentially promising port of embarkation. It has the capacity to roll out a new strategy and to consider from the outset how far the Canadian government needs to, or is willing to, intervene and on what bases. To this end, this report has offered a survey of existing international (best) practice for perusal and digestion within Canadian policy circles.

The report concludes by drawing attention to 8 concrete policy interventions being adopted in some of the most proactive countries. In no sense does it suggest these ought to be of central interest to the Canadian case or are the principal and only lessons Canada might learn. They are far from exhaustive and the reader will note that many more possibilities exist and have been presented above. But we offer them here by way of closing to bring some focus to future debate should Canada decide to progress in this area.

1. Definitional matters: The concept of the Global Citizen stands as one of Canada’s potentially most seminal contributions to debates on diaspora strategy. Scotland also has a very imaginative and inclusive classification of population groupings who might fall within its diaspora strategy and reference to the Scottish strategy might
assist in the further development of the idea of the Global Citizen. Scotland’s strategy includes Returning Scots who have come back to Scotland; New Scots who are about to leave Scotland; Live diaspora comprising individuals who were born in Scotland or have worked/studied in Scotland and are now living outside of Scotland; Ancestral diaspora who are individuals of Scottish descent, and; Affinity diaspora incorporating individuals with a direct or indirect connection to Scotland but with no genealogical link to the country.

2. Welfare to vulnerable groups: In the recent past, and especially following a natural or human disaster, the Canadian State has been required to provide humanitarian support to vulnerable overseas Canadians. Most countries confine this support to moments of greatest need and work to improve the capacities of Embassies and Consulates to respond rapidly and effectively. Very few extend welfare services directly from the homeland and on a routine bases. And yet for a modest investment Canada might consider developing a pre-emptive and practically and symbolically progressive Emigrant Support Programme, tied in part perhaps to its existing Development/Aid Programmes. Here, the Irish case holds some interest. Since 2004, The Irish Abroad Unit has overseen an Emigrant Support Programme. The Emigrant Support Programme resources culturally sensitive, frontline welfare services, directed at elderly Irish emigrants, the undocumented Irish in the US, the homeless in Britain, and those suffering from particular difficulties, including alcohol or mental health issues. The programme also funds the Irish Commission for Prisoners Overseas, which supports Irish citizens incarcerated abroad, and the Aisling Return to Ireland Project programme managed by the London Irish Centre which provides annual supported holidays to Ireland and aftercare for long-term, vulnerable Irish migrants in London. The Irish Abroad Unit also funds and manages the Emigrant Advice Network, a citizens advice network and source of essential and valuable information.

3. Philanthropy: Beyond the work undertaken by the leading Canadian Universities (McGill, Toronto, Western, Queens, UBC, Simon Fraser etc - around 10% of whose alumni dwell overseas) sourcing philanthropic giving from the diaspora for the betterment of Canada is not particularly strongly developed. Ireland has a weakly developed indigenous philanthropic landscape, but has been successful in cultivating philanthropy in the diaspora. The Ireland Funds (IF), International Fund for Ireland (IFI) and Atlantic Philanthropies (AP) are prime examples. Over the past thirty years, the Ireland Funds have raised more than €300m to be spent on projects in Ireland, IFI more than €850m, and AP more than €1.2 billion. In the main, these funds have been targeted at social disadvantage, education and welfare, the peace process in Northern Ireland, community development and, local economic initiatives with the aim of increasing social and economic capital. The Ireland Funds provides training courses in the area of philanthropic giving and is emerging as a world class educator in the science and art of diaspora philanthropy.

4. Roots Tourism: With a market of 2.8 million, Canada has the capacity to target at least some of its tourism campaigns to its overseas diasporic constituencies. Many countries are looking to their diasporic groups by way of promoting medical tourism, business-related tourism, heritage (or ‘roots’) tourism, exposure or ‘birthright’ tours, education tourism, VIP tours, and
peak experience tours. Scotland’s Homecoming 2009 was a flagship tourist campaign which sought to secure tourist visits from diasporans and thereafter to use these visits to build longer term relationship between Scotland and its diaspora. It is a model which is now being attempted in Ireland who is itself now actively marketing a Homecoming 2012 event.

5. Business networks: With a view to progressing debate on the virtues of introducing a new diaspora business network Canada needs to map the full range of existing business networks which connect the diaspora with Canada and to better understand the work these networks perform. There is a need to establish if there is demand for and a space in the landscape for a new flagship Canadian Business network. If a business network is required, Canada should learn from the experiences of countries who have built successful networks from scratch; Advance Australia, Global Scot, Kea New Zealand, Indus Entrepreneurs Network, and the networks run by Enterprise Ireland all provide useful models to begin the debate.

6. High Level Consultative Forum – Canada does not have a global forum in which to bring together its leading diasporic thought makers to advice on Canadian matters of interest and concern. Many countries now have such for a forum. A Global Irish Economic Forum was held in 2009 which brought together nearly 250 of the most influential Irish diaspora from around the world to explore how the diaspora might contribute to crises management and economic recovery and how Ireland might create a more strategic relationship with its diaspora. Meanwhile in Malaysia in November 2010 China hosted its first World Chinese Economic Forum (WCEF) under the banner of ‘Building Business Linkages and Charting New Frontiers’. Aimed at government officials, professional institutions, universities and think tanks, as well as entrepreneurs, professionals and investors from around the world, the forum sought to generate strategic ideas in support of the assertion of the coming of a ‘New Asian century’ and the rise of China as a global superpower. The World Class NZ Network is an invitation only, global network of very senior and influential New Zealanders and 'New Zealand-friendly' experts committed to accelerating New Zealand's development, international competitiveness and economic growth. The programme attempts to provide insight into sectors, technologies and global trends relevant to New Zealand.

7. Honours and Awards: Canada could use its honours and awards systems better to help build the Candianess of the Canadian diaspora and to foster Canadian mindedness more generally. World Class New Zealand is a joint venture between New Zealand Trade and Enterprise (NZTE) and Kea New Zealand. It consists of two separate initiatives the World Class NZ Awards and World Class NZ Network. The World Class NZ Awards were instituted in 2003 to honour New Zealanders who make a significant contribution to New Zealand’s esteem in the world. In 2010 a new 'Friend of New Zealand' category was introduced to acknowledge the wider affinity diaspora. A new Pravasi Bharatiya Divas (Overseas Indians Day) is celebrated on 9th January every year (the day in 1915 when Mahatma Gandhi returned to India from South Africa) and on this day a number of prestigious Pravasi Bharatiya Samman Awards are made to overseas Indians who have contributed to enhancing the country’s valour and global status.
8. Citizenship Models: *Clearly and arguably more so than other countries Canada has to find the right balance between designing models of citizenship which protect the country fiscally, politically and diplomatically whilst at the same time promote overseas citizens to engage rather than disengage with home.* Perhaps a new category of citizenship is required. The Overseas Citizenship of India (OCI) scheme extends a number of formally designated citizenship rights to overseas Indians – the categories of Persons of Indian Origin (PIOs) and Non-Resident Indians (NRIs) have been created. An OCI is eligible for a multiple entry, multi-purpose, life-long visa for visiting India, he/she is exempted from registration with Foreign Regional Registration Officers or Foreign Registration Officers for any length of stay in India, and is entitled to general ‘parity’ with Non-Resident Indians in respect to such matters as paying tariffs on domestic air fares, and entry fees to public facilities, access to national parks, wildlife sanctuaries, national monuments, historical sites and museums, and the right to practice such professions as doctors, dentists, nurses, pharmacists, advocates, architects, and chartered accountants.
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INTERVIEWS

As part of this research two field visits were made to Canada (Toronto, Vancouver, and Ottawa) between August 25th and September 10th 2010, and October 14th to October 23rd 2010. During these visits interviews and meetings were held with the following individuals:

John D Chalmers, Grand Secretary of Canada, The Grand Orange Lodge of British America, Toronto

James Bell CEO, Secretary-Treasurer Orange Insurance, Grand Secretary of Canada, The Grand Orange Lodge of British America, Toronto

Sandra McEoghain Irish Association of Toronto

Richard Kellar Manager, Strategic Research and Data Analyses University of Toronto, Alumni University Advancement Office

Teo Salgado Manager, Regional Programs, University of Toronto, Alumni University Advancement Office

Professor Ken McDonald Centre for the Study of Diaspora and Transnational Communities University of Toronto

Professor Ato Quayson, Director Centre for the Study of Diaspora and Transnational Communities University of Toronto

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Georgina Galloway Deleguee Commercial Edu Canada DFAIT

Michael MacKenzie, Executive Director Canadian Snowboard Association Toronto

Kenny Zhang, Senior Research Analyst at the Asia Pacific Foundation of Canada, Vancouver

Professor David Ley, Canada Research Chair in Geography, University of British Colombia, Vancouver.

Professor Audrey Kobayashi, Professor in Geography, Queens University, Kingston Ontario.

Sean Mitton Founder of the Canadian Expat Network, North Carolina.

Niall Cronin, Policy Research Division, DFAIT Ottowa

Weldon Epp, Director, Policy Research Division, DFAIT, Ottowa.

Christine Climenhage, Policy Research Division, DFAIT, Ottowa.

In addition the authors participated in a Round Table Discussion titled Global Citizens: Understanding their Influence on International Relations organized jointly by the DFAIT/APF Canada at the Annual Convention of the International Studies Association in Montreal on March 17th 2011. Participants included Chair Arif Lalani, Canadian Department of Foreign Affairs and International Trade, Yuen Pau Woo, Asia Pacific Foundation of Canada, Yevgeny Kuznetsov, World Bank, Mark McDowell, Embassy of Canada, Beijing, Mark Boyle, National University of Ireland, and Kenny Zhang, Asia Pacific Foundation of Canada.
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**Key Web Addresses**


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